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for women and has desensitized us to those outcomes. The paper
then applies that thesis to understandings of “equality” within a
hierarchical framework, arguing that the equality-liberty dichotomy is
false in the context of gender discrimination in the workplace.
Instead the paper argues that disparate treatment is a liberty concern.
In seeking to have our professional fates married to the fates of our
male colleagues—which is what workplace equality doctrines aim to
do—women are seeking to be only as free as our male colleagues are
to find work and to find meaning in our work, to procreate or not, to
coast along or to stand out, and, if we choose, to stand alone.
Further, this paper offers the perspective that as feminist advocates we
should resist the inclination to make our peace with the ordering of
the gendered paradigms as they stand and to negotiate compromises
from these vantage points. Within this theoretical framework, this
paper explores the implications of the “regulation” versus
“governance” debate in the context of gender discrimination. The
article suggests that renaming and reframing aside, the approach
embodied by the governance paradigm as it is applied to gender
discriminatory contexts is neither new nor a deal for those already
occupying a subordinate bargaining position, but it is instead a
framework by which to privilege existing power structures and
efficiency-based values over other values and interests. Moreover, this
paper defends the civil rights model of rules-based state-enforced
mandatory anti-discrimination measures, such as Title VII, as an
admittedly non-panacean yet nonetheless indispensable means by
which private gender hierarchies are inhibited. Finally, this paper
contends that in looking to the law to inhibit this particular privatelyenforced tyranny, women are correctly interpreting the obligation of
the state within our constitutional scheme to disrupt private tyrannies
when those tyrannies reach the point of functioning as class-based
power monopolies, limiting the fundamental freedoms of those
outside the monopolist class.

***
INTRODUCTION: WOMEN ARE STILL TREATED DIFFERENTLY AT WORK,
BUT THE ASSIMILATION MODEL HAS HELPED US TO STOP CARING
A friend of mine, a BigLaw escapee, described to me how she
suddenly decided to leave her BigLaw firm job in the midst of a
recruiting lunch. The story unfolds as follows: she, a second year
litigation associate, was lunching with her mentee, a first-year male
litigation associate, and a female law school recruit. During the first
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part of the lunch, my friend listened as her mentee truthfully detailed
for the benefit of the recruit the interesting brief-writing he had done
during the course of his first year at the firm, as well as the engaging
issues he had researched, and the points of law he had summarized.
At the end of this pitch, the female recruit turned politely to my
friend, the senior attorney at the table, the mentor, the female
litigator, and asked, “And has your practice been similar?” In truth,
my friend, like ninety percent of the women in her class, had spent
the last two years—in the same litigation department, mind you—
occupied primarily with administrative work rather than legal
research or analysis.1 As she sat there, in the proverbial hot seat for
the firm, she suddenly could not imagine why she was engaged in the
project of recruiting a highly qualified woman candidate to her firm.
“No,” she replied, gesturing towards her male mentee, “but in a few
years they may let me work for him.”
With this indiscretion my friend betrayed the firm’s open secret
concerning women litigators and the “bad” work. Apparently, it was
widely known among both men and women associates at her firm that
women associates were assigned administrative work while similarly
situated male associates were assigned more analytically substantive
work. As inhabitants of the professional world, do we find this
anecdote surprising?2 When shopping this story around to other
1. Cf. J. Stratton Shartel, More Female Litigators Relegated to Non-Trial Work,
Survey Finds, 9 NO. 2 INSIDE LITIG. 12, 12 (1995) (reporting the results of a survey of
500 litigation attorneys).
Male litigators in private practice tend to spend more time at trial than their
female colleagues, while women litigators spend more of their time on
non-trial responsibilities such as settlement negotiation and document
preparation, according to a recent survey of attorneys conducted by Inside
Litigation.
The results paint a disheartening picture of an environment in which men
spend more of their time in the courtroom, reaping the rewards of trial
experience, favorable verdicts, and high visibility, while women are assigned
secondary roles, making advancement more difficult.
Id.
2. It should not be surprising. In fact, in researching this project what is most
surprising is how remarkably well documented and discussed an experience this is,
and has been for literally decades. A disparate treatment researcher could hardly
swing a dead cat without hitting an array of examples of assignment or promotion
gender-based disparities at a law firm. Consider, for example, a similar law firm “case
study” described by Susan Sturm several years ago:
A group of women have questioned recent decisions denying women
promotion to partnership, the firm’s general failure to retain and promote
women despite comparable entry credentials, and a series of individual
incidents that triggered complaints of sexual harassment and gender bias. In
part because the firm aggressively recruits women at the entry level and fails
to track patterns in work assignment and promotion, the firm’s management
has been largely unaware of any problem until these complaints arose. The
complaints involved a range of issues: differences in patterns of work
assignment and training opportunities among men and women; tolerance of
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BigLaw lawyers, it has rarely been received with surprise or disbelief.
Instead, the tale has often been met with various pragmatic accounts
for the disparity, frequently along the lines of: “Women leave firms.
The good work is scarce, and is reserved for those who are more likely
to stay.” This explanation, although certainly incomplete, lays bare an
internalized bottom line that prioritizes efficiency in information costs
over equal opportunity. It is efficient, rational, inaccurate, and
discriminatory, but is it surprising?
What is surprising, although perhaps it should not be, is that
people—meaning here, primarily lawyers—are consistently
underwhelmed when presented with the topic of this decidedly less
sexy subset of workplace gender discrimination: disparate treatment.
Disparate treatment, it seems, while widely acknowledged, is no
longer a problem of stirring concern.
Courteous inquiries
concerning this project have frequently fronted a look which
communicates, “Now? Surely we have finished with that by now—
would you perhaps be better occupied by considering the future of
Roe?”
The most striking aspect of this two-pronged incredulity is the latter
point, the surely-we-are-finished-with-that-by-now point.3 Of course we
a sexualized work environment by partners who are otherwise significant
“rainmakers”; routine comments by male lawyers, particularly in the
predominantly male departments, on the appearance, sexuality, and
competence of women; harsh assessments of women’s capacities and work
styles based on gender stereotypes; avoidance of work-related contact with
women by members of particular departments; and hyper-scrutiny of
women’s performance by some, and the invisibility of women’s contributions
to others.
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 470 (2001). And another strikingly similar
example:
Consider, for example, a litigation law firm that promotes almost exclusively
from within its own ranks. The hiring partners at the firm have no problem
hiring women and regularly hire entering classes that are fifty percent
women. The partners simply refuse to hire women who they perceive to be
aggressive, loud, and competitive. The partners just do not like women with
these personality traits, preferring women who are a bit more “girly,” giggly,
and deferential. They regularly hire women from top law schools who fit this
mold. Despite the law firm’s frequent hiring of female associates, very few
women are invited to join the partnership ranks. In order to become an
equity partner in the firm, a candidate must have a reputation as a tough and
aggressive litigator and be able to bring business into the firm. By the time
associates reach the firm’s six year up-or-out deadline, significantly fewer
female associates than male associates have these attributes. Without any
discrimination taking place at the time of the partnership decision, far fewer
women than men are promoted to partner at the firm.
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument
Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 227 (2004).
3. And least of all among lawyers, whose own experience in the contemporary
legal workplace, coupled with their exposure to what one hopes was at least a passing
acquaintanceship with anti-discrimination law during their legal education, should
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are not. For three decades—more than a generation—men and
women have worked side by side in legally-mandated genderintegrated workplaces, and yet women collectively inhabit a markedly
subordinate sphere in the workforce.4 In fact, so pronounced a
predictor is gender in determining workplace outcomes for
identically qualified people that it is difficult to imagine that such
inequity would be tolerated if the predictive criterion were any other
immutable quality.5 Yet we are no longer roused at the mention of
result in an heightened awareness that women working in the legal profession get up
in the morning and go to a different workplace.
[W]omen comprise about one-half of the ABA-accredited law school
graduating class but account for only 16.81% of the partners in law firms
nationwide. More than half—70.9%—of women lawyers work in private
practice law firms. These figures suggest that, relative to total headcounts,
women attorneys are under-represented among those in partnership.
Although graduating from law school and being hired as entry-level attorneys
in adequate numbers during the past decade, women are not remaining with
their law firm employers as career lawyers who aspire to and achieve
partnership status.
Paula Patton, Women Lawyers, Their Status, Influence and Retention in the Legal
Profession, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 173, 173 (2005). Consider, too, for
example, Deborah Rhode’s observations:
In law, as in life, women are underrepresented at the top and
overrepresented at the bottom. Women now account for a majority of law
school applicants and almost 30% of the profession, but only about 15% of
federal judges and law firm partners, 10% of law school deans and general
counsels, and 5% of managing partners of large firms. Women in legal
practice make about $20,000 a year less than men, and surveys of law firms
and corporate counsel salaries have consistently found a significant gender
gap even among those with similar positions and experience. Moreover,
male and female attorneys with similar qualifications do not obtain similar
positions. Studies involving thousands of lawyers have found that men are at
least twice as likely as similarly qualified women to obtain partnership.
Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem Problem, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1001, 1002-03 (2002) (citations omitted). Moreover, lest we think
academia is deemed above the fray:
The national statistics for women in legal education are bleak: approximately
26% of tenured law professors and 17% of law school deans are female. A
woman applying for a tenure-track job may have worse odds of being hired
than a man. Not only do the statistics reveal that women receive tenure at
lower rates than men, but they also demonstrate that women are paid less
than similarly qualified men of the same status and with the same experience.
Finally, women are hired in teaching jobs off the conventional tenure track,
in positions such as lecturers and instructors, at higher frequencies than men.
Mary Elizabeth Basile, False Starts: Harvard Law School’s Efforts Toward Integrating
Women into the Faculty, 1928-1981, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 143, 143-44 (2005)
(citations omitted).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2004) (prohibiting the exclusion of women
from the workforce based solely on their gender over the last forty years). Of course,
women worked outside the home, particularly in non-white collar professions, long
before Title VII required that they must be permitted the privilege of doing so. See
Deborah A. Ballam, Affirmative Action: Purveyor of Preferential Treatment or
Guarantor of Equal Opportunity? A Call for a “Revisionsing” of Affirmative Action, 18
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 1, 6 (1997) (noting that Title VII’s framers intended for
women to slowly but surely gain equal opportunity in the workforce after its passage).
5. Identically qualified here includes accounting for the presence of children at
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that glass ceiling we first heard about twenty years ago.6 In truth, we
have seen the surveys, the studies, the statistics and we know the score:
as women in the workplace our choices are fewer, our power less, and
our pay inferior as compared to our similarly situated male
colleagues.7 Rarely do we set workplace policy, and even when we do,
the resulting policy is as likely to reflect a “female accommodation”
model of gender integration—itself an unsatisfactory rendering of
gender equality—than when a man is in the decision-making chair.8
When women do make it to the “top,” they most often do so by way of
home. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d
Cir. 2004) (suggesting that an employer can treat mothers and fathers in a similarly
discriminatory manner).
6. See Christina Del Valle, Glass Ceiling? What Glass Ceiling?, BUS.WK., Oct. 24,
1994, available at http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1994/b33958.arc.htm
(stating that only three of ninety-three invited companies showed up to a hearing
held by the Glass Ceiling Commission); see also Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying
Employment Discrimination Against African-American Males, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 23,
76 n.286 (1996) (providing that “the term ‘glass ceiling’ was first used” by Carol
Hymowitz and Timothy D. Schellhardt of the Wall Street Journal in The Glass
Ceiling: Why Women Can’t Seem to Break the Invisible Barrier that Blocks Them
from the Top Jobs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1986, at D1, D4-5).
7 See INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, THE GENDER WAGE RATIO: WOMEN’S AND
MEN’S EARNINGS (2005) [hereinafter GENDER WAGE RATIO], http://www.iwpr.org/
pdf/C350.pdf (stating that women’s annual earnings are still below men’s); see also
DANIEL H. WEINBERG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEPT. OF COM., Evidence from Census
2000 About Earnings by Detailed Occupation for Men and Women (2004) (observing
the ratio of women’s earnings to men’s earning by percentile in 1999); Nancy J.
Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in
Legal Careers, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 27, 35-36 (2005) (explaining that “[t]he
compensation gap between men and women is not unique to the legal profession
either).
Studies of full-time workers conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor show
a persistent, albeit narrowing, gap in men and women’s earnings. In 1979,
when comparable earnings data were first available, women earned about 63
percent as much as men did. In 2000, median weekly earnings for female
full-time wage and salary workers was $491, or 76 percent of the $464 median
for their male counterparts. A survey of the members of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (life sciences professionals)
revealed that men earn almost one-third more than women, $94,000 versus
$72,000. The difference is greatest among academic administrators. The
report finds “evidence that women are paid less for similar work even when
type of employer is held constant.” Gender gaps in compensation are a fact
of life for professionals on Wall Street as well. In one study, women earned
60.5 percent of what their male counterparts earned in 1997. Finally, a
Catalyst study of over one thousand men and women senior executives found
that while only 16 percent of the men surveyed earned less than $200,000 in
2001, 38 percent of the women reported earning less than $200,000.
Id. (citations omitted); see also AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, GAINS IN LEARNING, GAPS IN
EARNINGS: A GUIDE TO STATE AND NAT’L DATA (2004), available at http://www.aauw.
org/research/statedata (providing that a “typical college-educated woman working
full time earns $44,200 a year compared to $61,800 for college-educated male
workers—a difference of $17,600!").
8 See Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 365, 390 (2004) (explaining that employers often construe their
flexible work arrangements as a “great deal” to women when it may be an expression
of gender bias rather than a solution).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss1/3

6

Render: The Man, The State and You: The Role of the State in Regulating G

2006]

THE MAN, THE STATE AND YOU

79

the assimilation model.9 They serve as powerful symbols of the
ultimate achievability of assimilation.10 They remind the rest of us to
stop our whining and learn to “fit in.”11 Consequently, this is not a
paper about whether or why women are discriminated against in the
workforce, insomuch as it is a paper about the ways in which we have
made our peace with it, and in so doing, the ways in which we have
settled for temporary membership in a permanent underclass.
Further, as to the former point, the timing concern, now is an
admittedly unfashionable time to be concerned with the disparate
treatment of women in the workplace.12 It is a subtle topic when
contrasted against our present political climate of near-constant crisis,
when the future of Title VII itself is precariously moored within its
ebbing Commerce Clause host, and the promise of an American Age
of Reason seems to be inexplicitly eluding our collective
jurisprudential grasp. From a feminist standpoint, in light of the
times, the problems of workplace gender equality do little to
command attention, worried as we are about protecting what we
perceive to be more fundamental civil liberties.13 Conventional inthe-trenches wisdom tells us that now is not the time for pressing
forward with equality-based doctrines.14 Instead, under duress as we
are, we should compartmentalize our egalitarian goals from our more
primal liberty concerns, as though discrimination—and at work, of all
places—fails to implicate first-order autonomy and independence.
Meanwhile, elsewhere in this same cultural climate, ivory tower voices
have become increasingly critical of the concept of the civil rights topdown regulatory model as a tool for shoe horning social inequities
into egalitarian reformations.15 Concurrently, stalwart principles of
9. Or its corollary exploitation model, whereby the successful woman capitalizes
on traditionally misogynistic ideals of femininity. For a discussion of the assimilation
model of female liberation, see Meredith Render, Misogyny, Androgyny, and Sexual
Harassment: Sex Discrimination in a Gender-Deconstructed World, 29 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 99 (2006).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Del Valle, supra note 6.
13. See, e.g., Rob Stein, Pharmacists’ Rights at Front of New Debate: Because of
Beliefs, Some Refuse to Fill Birth Control Prescriptions, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at
A01 (discussing the current debate over whether a pharmacist’s right to not dispense
birth control due to personal or religious beliefs conflicts with a woman’s right to
contraception).
14. See Del Valle, supra note 6 (suggesting that few employers even acknowledge
the problem of the glass ceiling).
15. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996) (voicing skepticism of the conventional
picture of the judiciary’s counter-majoritarian righter of egalitarian wrongs); MICHAEL
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 5 (2004) (arguing that constitutional
interpretation reflects the social and political climate of the times because judges live
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anti-discrimination law in the gender context have been losing rather
than gaining currency in both the courts and the academy.16 Thus, at
this particular cultural moment does it seem reasonable to wonder
“why now?”
In response to this question, this paper offers an alternative
framework to the equality-liberty dichotomy, suggesting, or more
accurately recollecting, that disparate treatment is a liberty concern.
This paper recalls that in seeking to have our professional fates
married to the fates of our male colleagues—which is what workplace
equality doctrines aim to do—women are seeking to be only as free as
our male colleagues are to find work and to find meaning in our
work, to procreate or not, to coast along or to stand out, and, if we
choose, to stand alone.17 The paper contends that this liberty interest
within those cultural times).
16. For example, a Ninth Circuit panel recently held that an employer policy
requiring women, and only women, to wear make-up did not constitute gender
discrimination under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), because the
policy imposed grooming requirements on both men and women, and thus did not
impose an “unequal burden on women.” Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392
F.3d 1076, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
2005). The court cited as binding precedent a 1974 Ninth Circuit decision which
predates Price Waterhouse by more than a decade, and which held that employers
may impose sex differentiated grooming requirements on employees. Id. at 1080
(citing Baker v. Cal. Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1974)). The court
reasoned that its 1974 decision was not inconsistent with Price Waterhouse’s
admonishment against employer policies that require conformity with gender
stereotypes:
Although Price Waterhouse held that Title VII bans discrimination against an
employee on the basis of that employee’s failure to dress and behave
according to the stereotype corresponding with her gender, it did not
address the specific question of whether an employer can impose
sex-differentiated appearance and grooming standards on its male and
female employees. Nor have our subsequent cases invalidated the “unequal
burdens” test as a means of assessing whether sex-differentiated appearance
standards discriminate on the basis of sex.
Id. at 1082. In light of this holding, the problem with Price Waterhouse’s
recommendation that Ann Hopkins dress more femininely was not that it required
her to conform to a sex-differentiated standard of dress, but was, instead, that there
was no evidence on record that male employees were likewise urged to dress in a
masculine way, should they aspire to ascend through the Price Waterhouse ranks.
But see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. Separate (or in this case, only slightly
more subtlety dubbed, sex-differentiated) but equal lives and breathes in the Ninth
Circuit, at least for the moment (rehearing en banc has been granted).
17. We have concentrated much on what it costs women to bear children when
they do not want to, but we have considered too little what it costs women not to bear
children when they do want to. See SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, CREATING A LIFE 86 (2002)
(providing that forty-nine percent of women over forty who earn more than onehundred thousand dollars a year do not have children). That compares with
nineteen percent of men in the same category. Id. And lest you assume that these
women chose the life they’re living, only fourteen percent said they had not wanted
children. Id. Choosing between engaging work (or for many women, economic selfsufficiency of any sort) and children is a Hobson’s choice that men in this culture do
not face. It is a gendered dilemma that is not dissimilar to the pre-Roe choice
between abstinence (to the extent this was possible, given the realities of rape, incest
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continues to be threatened by the proliferating and private hegemony
of the andocentric paradigm within our hierarchical society. Further,
this paper offers the perspective that as egalitarian advocates we ought
not to ignore the role that androcentricism plays in mapping the
professional lives of women, simply because we fear we lack the
political tools or will at present to adequately address it. We should
resist the inclination to make our peace with the ordering of the
gendered paradigms as they stand and to negotiate compromises
from these vantage points, because in so doing we concede the point
not that we presently inhabit a subordinate position, but that we are
subordinate.18
Moreover, this article explores the gender implications of the
recently revived regulation versus laissez-fare debate, or as it has been
recast of late, the New Deal top-down paradigm versus the “Renew
Deal” governance paradigm.19 The article suggests that renaming
and reframing aside, the approach embodied by the governance
paradigm as it is applied to discriminatory contexts is neither new nor
is it a deal for those already occupying a subordinate bargaining
position. It is instead a familiar framework by which to privilege
existing power structures and efficiency-based values over equality.
The article contends that moving away from a regulatory model
functions to abandon the understanding of “equality” at work as a
function of first order liberty, which, in the view of the author, is a
mistake for those who carry with them a history of subordination.
Further, this paper defends the civil rights model of rules-based stateenforced mandatory anti-discrimination measures, such as Title VII, as
an admittedly non-panacean yet nonetheless indispensable means by
which private gendered hierarchies are inhibited. Finally, this paper
and so forth) or the risks of bearing a child—a choice which men also did not face.
18. The concept of gendered paradigms expressed here includes gendered
expressions and presentation as well as sex.
19. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 345-47 (2004)
(identifying the emergence of a “new governance paradigm”). This paradigm is
synthesized
from a myriad of recent scholarly theories including the following: “reflexive
law,” “soft law,” “collaborative governance,” “democratic experimentalism,”
“responsive regulation,” “outsourcing regulation,” “reconstitutive law,”
“post-regulatory law,” “revitalizing regulation,” “regulatory pluralism,”
“decentering
regulation,”
“meta-regulation,”
“contractarian
law,”
“communicative governance,” “negotiated governance,” “destabilization
rights,” “cooperative implementation,” “interactive compliance,” “public
laboratories,” “deepened democracy and empowered participatory
governance,” “pragmatic lawyering,” “nonrival partnership,” and “a daring
legal system.”
Id. (citations omitted). Professor Lobel supports the newness claim, attributing the
political pendulum shift of the past five years to a “new reality” to which legal thought
and practice must “transform themselves to adjust.” Id. at 357.
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contends that in looking to the law to inhibit this particular private
tyranny, women are correctly interpreting the obligation of the state
within our constitutional scheme to disrupt private tyrannies when
those tyrannies reach the point of functioning as class-based power
monopolies, limiting the fundamental freedoms of those outside the
monopolist class.
This set of arguments is presented in the following format: Part II
explores ways in which equality can be conceptualized within a
hierarchical scheme, first by identifying the current dominate
gendered hierarchy of androcentricism and assimilation, and
considering the ways in which this hierarchy has affected our
understanding of the issue of disparate treatment at work. Next, the
paper considers the places at which gender “equality” interests
intersect with the liberty axis and suggests that gender discrimination
at work is a liberty concern. Part III of the paper discusses the role
the state in the regulation of private hierarchies, considers the relative
merits and drawbacks of the so-called governance model of
employment law, and ultimately offers an unqualified defense of the
civil rights model of inhibiting gender discrimination in the
workplace.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING EQUALITY IN A HIERARCHICAL SCHEMA
The use of a hypothetical may assist in humanizing or at least
solidifying a consideration of what the introduction has threatened
will be an unfortunate series of -isms and other abstractions.
Adopting the introductory scenario and folding it into a hypothetical,
it may look something like this: a class of ten spanking new associates
enters a litigation firm, each associate clutching to his or her breast an
excellent transcript and fond memories of an appellate clerkship. Of
this class, seven are women and three are men.20 Of the thirty
associates already at the firm, three are women—a disparity of
attrition rather than of hiring. Still, undaunted by this ratio, the seven
new female hires march confidently into their litigation practices,
where upon six of them are immediately assigned work on a client
that requires primarily administrative and oversight work from
associates. None of the three men are assigned to this client, and
during the following year, the men easily lap the women several times
over in terms of gaining trial and discovery exposure, brief writing
and other marketable litigation experience. The disparity here
concerns assignments, and the hypothetical will assume to isolate that

20. For the sake of simplicity the hypothetical will assume that none of the new
hires, male or female, have children.
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particular, and evidently not uncommon, phenomena.21 Moreover,
this disparity in experience begins to feed upon itself, as assignments
that require particular experience become increasingly beyond the
reach of the female associates. Predictably, by the end of the class’s
second year at the firm, two of the original three women associates
have left, as have five of the seven now second-year female associates.
But not to worry, law school recruit, the new incoming class is
comprised of seventy percent women, so things should even out.
And worry, we do not. Every year, legions of bright, qualified
women march into this and countless similar employment situations,
undaunted by the odds that women statistically face in those
contexts.22 Certainly part of the reason this happens is less the result
of a lack of foresight and more the result of a lack of
nondiscriminatory alternatives.23 However, something more happens
to keep us marching: every now and again at reliable intervals, a
woman makes it within the system.24 Moreover, when a woman makes
it, she often makes it big, and it is this beacon of attainability, the
uber-successful woman within the existing structure—the managing
partner, the supreme court justice, the CEO, the secretary of state—
which leads us to believe that the structure itself is not flawed and that
the origin of any failures, statistical or otherwise, lies within ourselves.

21. Cf. SUSAN NOSSEL & ELIZABETH WESTFALL, PRESUMED EQUAL: WHAT AMERICA’S
TOP LAWYERS REALLY THINK ABOUT THEIR FIRMS xii (1998). The survey synthesized
responses from twelve-hundred women attorneys practicing at law firms that employ
fifty women attorneys or more. The survey has been described as demonstrating that
[c]learly, assignment quality matters. And some of the women who
completed the survey said they were shunted into less significant roles when
male partners were unable to overcome feelings about which duties were
“appropriate” for women. In the end, these women felt that their lack of
exposure to more challenging work hurt their chances at partnership and
limited hands-on experience gained through client contact.
Institute of Management and Administration, Inc., What You Can Learn from
Women Lawyers’ Views of Their Firms, COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR LAW OFFICES
(Apr. 1998).
22. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, DIVERSITY IN LAW FIRMS (2003)
[hereinafter EEOC], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/reports/diversitylaw/
#status.
The average number of women and White male associates in the sample
firms are nearly identical (37.68 for women and 37.60 for White men).
However, the mean number of White male partners far exceeds the mean
number of women partners at 12.71 percent. The mean odds ratio for this
comparison is 5.330; clearly not even odds for the two groups.
Id.
23. See Reichman & Sterling, supra note 7, at 35-36 (noting the widespread
income disparities in all professions).
24. See Suzanne Hoppough, Most Powerful Women in Media, FORBES, July 28,
2005, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2005/07/28/lists-powerfulwomen-media05powo
m_cz_sh_0728media.html (highlighting several successful businesswomen such as
Janet Robinson, Marjorie Scardino, and Oprah Winfrey).
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When the media applauds the superstar, or the woman who has
survived the odds, it doesn’t take into account the millions who
continue to live in poverty. A generation later, the idea of women’s
full participation in American life brought subtle advances, though
it is generally no more than mere tokenism which has assuaged the
consciences of the powerful.25

In fact, the existence of a minority of highly visible, highly
successful women does much more than assuage the consciences of
the powerful, it assuages the concerns of relevant class, it reassures
women generally that they too could one day be well-placed within
the hierarchy, and creates a cottage industry of book pushers
explaining to women how to beat the odds.26 The presence of one or
two highly placed women partners, for example, reassures the brighteyed women recruits in our hypothetical that they are reasonably
likely to succeed at BigLaw, in a way that simple statistical realities fail
to vanquish.27 Seeing some women succeed, and succeed so
dramatically, we are inspired, we are challenged, and we are ready to
follow in their footsteps. We are blinded by the brilliance of
possibility.
A. The Current Gender Schematic:
Cherry-Picking and Trickle-Down
The facts, nevertheless, counsel circumspection.28 Consider, for
example, the following: “There are six female CEOs of Fortune 500
companies, an elite handful who have beaten the odds. But it is not
certain they will propel many other women to the top. Among the
[twenty-four] best-paid executives working for those six CEOs, only
three are women.”29
25. Barbara L. Bernier, Assimilation or Liberation: Post-Modern American
Women—Speech and Property Law, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 521, 530-31 (2004)
(asserting further that “[t]he women’s movement suffers from the same problem of
the civil right’s movement—that is, expecting that assimilation is equivalent to
liberation as the answer to full citizenship status in America.”).
26. For a random and unendorsed selection of sports-themed go-girl literature,
see RONNA LICHTENBERG, PITCH LIKE A GIRL: HOW A WOMAN CAN BE HERSELF AND STILL
SUCCEED (Rodale 2005) (1993); GAIL EVANS, PLAY LIKE A MAN, WIN LIKE A WOMAN
(2000); PAT HEIM & SUSAN K. GOLANT, HARDBALL FOR WOMEN: WINNING AT THE GAME
OF BUSINESS (1993). Alternatively there are the sugar-and-spice-and-everything-nice
themed selections. See, e.g., KATE WHITE, WHY GOOD GIRLS DON’T GET AHEAD BUT
GUTSY GIRLS DO (1996); LOIS P. FRANKEL, NICE GIRLS DON’T GET THE CORNER OFFICE:
101 UNCONSCIOUS MISTAKES WOMEN MAKE THAT SABOTAGE THEIR CAREERS (2004)
[hereinafter FRANKEL, CORNER OFFICE]; LOIS P. FRANKEL, NICE GIRLS DON’T GET RICH
(2005).
27. EEOC, supra note 22.
28. See Patton, supra note 3, at 173; Rhode, supra note 3, at 1002-03; Basile, supra
note 3, at 143-44; GENDER WAGE RATIO, supra note 7; WEINBERG, supra note 7;
Reichman & Sterling, supra note 7, at 35; AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 7.
29. See Del Jones, Few Women Hold Top Executive Jobs, Even When CEOs are
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Under the circumstances, “an elite handful has beaten the odds”
seems an apt description of these special women who have been
selected for advancement within a system skewed against them. In a
real sense, these odds-beating uber-successful women have received
the treble scepters of respect, economic autonomy and power in the
workplace, and their well-placed presence in the workforce
demonstrates that women—as a category—are not excluded from the
power structure. If bias exists, it is not directed against women as a
class in such a way as to preclude the advancement of all women, just
most women. Thus, if bias accounts for disparate gendered outcomes
at work, it is a bias that is calibrated to detect and prefer certain
women over others—or, as is posited here, it is a bias that prefers
some gendered qualities over others.
The persistence of a handful of elite successes while the
overwhelming majority of women remain less likely to succeed than
their male counterparts raises several questions, the first of which is
why “these particular women?”30 On some level, women who reach
the top at work have gamed the system. They have brought to the
table a degree of desirability that eludes the majority of women.31 Are
the women who succeed the smartest women? Are they the most
hardworking? Are they the most competent? Are we dealing here
with perhaps a genuine American meritocracy?32
Maybe. It is possible that in the course of the last thirty years
women’s physical integration into professional settings previously
reserved exclusively for men has had the effect of breaking down the
preexisting hierarchical ordering of gender and, importantly,
gendered expressions as they relate to issues of workplace
competence. It may be the case that gender-indifferent market forces
Female, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 2003, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/
jobcenter/2003-01-26-womenceos_x.htm (explaining that the few companies that are
run by women do not necessarily promote other women more frequently); see also
Tristin K Green, Discrimination in the Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 96 (2003)
(stating that “[a]lthough white men made up 43% of the workforce, they held 95% to
97% of the senior manager, vice-president and higher positions in [Fortune 500
service firms]”).
30. Actually, the first is probably, “Why so few women?” However the question of
why discrimination persists in the workplace is complex and well exceeds the scope of
this article. For an account of the persistence of workplace gendered disparities, see
Sturm, supra note 2, at 59-60.
31. See FRANKEL, CORNER OFFICE, supra note 26, at xiv.
32. Perhaps we are, and no considerations presented here forecloses the
possibility that the most successful women are among the smartest, most
hardworking, most competent of their peers. Indeed, they very likely are. See Event
Celebrates the Accomplishments of Michigan Women; Michigan Women’s Hall of
Fame Honors [Ten] New Members, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 17, 2005, available at
http://releases.usnewswire.com/getrelease.asp?:d=55/55 (listing the ten women
inductees and their accomplishments).
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alone are at play in the hiring and promoting of women, and it just
turns out that ninety-eight percent of women in the workforce are not
competent to hold positions of significant responsibility.
Or,
alternatively, any number of other bias-free explanations may account
for the disparity, including: women chose not to take competitive
jobs; women make other lifestyle choices; men are less comfortable
working with women because of the chilling effect of antidiscrimination laws; and so forth.33
This paper, however, proposes an alternative explanation
predicated largely on the theory that the model of female liberation
that evolved in response to “first generation” gender discriminations
failed to address the misogynist notions about women underlying the
initial distributions of power between men and women.34 This
theory, which I have described in greater detail elsewhere, holds that
rather than reordering hierarchical gender preferences which held
women to be inferior to men, the andocentric-assimilation model of
female liberation allowed women to immigrate from their
subordinate status insofar as they were (and are) willing and able to
approximate existing and idealized andocentric norms.35 The theory
further holds that as a result of this particular evolution of gender
deconstruction, deeply misogynist notions about feminized women—
that is, women who express or are perceived to embody a gender
identity which is farther away on the gendered continuum from
andocentric ideal—persist, and have in fact been aggravated by the
assimilation model.36 However, the theory holds, post-assimilation,
these gendered ideas are, ironically, far less identifiable in part
because they fail to apply to all “women.”37
The example of our BigLaw hypothetical proves instructive on this
point. The firm hires a lot of women—many more women than men.
The firm is aggressively trying to increase the ratio of female associates
to male associates, and as an institution it remains sincerely baffled by
its gender-skewed attrition. Nonetheless, when the women arrive at
BigLaw, they are treated differently than their male counterparts, and
this treatment must be predicated on some perceived difference. If
33. See Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 42 (announcing that many high-powered women choose to leave work
when they become mothers because they find it less intense and more fulfilling).
34. Sturm, supra note 2, at 466 (stating that “[f]irst generation discrimination
revolved around deliberate exclusion or subordination based on race or gender”).
“This form of unequal treatment violated clear and uncontroversial norms of fairness
and formal equality.” Id.
35. Render, supra note 9.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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we accept for the moment that the otherness associated with most
women remains tied to pre-assimilation notions about women as a
category, we can assume that their difference is defined, at least in
part, in contrast to competency, intelligence and efficacy.38 Thus,
however competent or intelligent the women litigators may be in spite
of their otherness, the fact of their otherness nonetheless renders
them more difficult to identify with, to talk to, and to trust than their
male colleagues.
Their otherness also presents dangers and
difficulties in the establishment of nonsexual workplace intimacies,
bonding and camaraderie. Gradually, most of them are isolated from
the good work and the powerful partners. All but a very few are
relegated to the back of the proverbial bus.
From this vantage point, it is not so great a leap to imagine that
those few women who pass more easily among the partnership
brotherhood are in some way either self-identified or coded as “less
different” than the majority of the female associates that hemorrhage
out of BigLaw every year. On some level, the women who succeed
within this model are perceived to embody what it takes to make it at
BigLaw. These few women somehow avoid, or at least mitigate, the
stigma of otherness. In this light, it seems possible that those women
who manage to beat the odds do so because they express or are
perceived to express a gender identity that is more closely aligned
with the andocentric ideal embraced by BigLaw. It is possible that
women who have succeeded within an andro-idealized workplace (as
compared to other similarly qualified women) have done so, at least
in part, by complementing rather than challenging andocentric
norms regarding competency and worth.
For example, in describing the qualities that facilitated the success
of a woman who is chairman of a 630 lawyer firm, Lawrence Fish,
chief executive of Citizens Financial Group observed, “She took a
corner office, she got a big desk, and she didn’t dress in pastels.”39 In
other words, in the view of this particular male CEO, the woman he
describes succeeded by escaping the otherness stigma of being a
woman and its attendant presumption of incompetence and
inferiority by eschewing a stereotypically feminized presentation and
embodying—at least better than a pastel-clad woman would have—the
existing andro-idealized vision of a successful, competent law firm
leader.40 Or put more simply: she met with his existing expectations.
38. Id.
39. Kimberly Blanton, Case Study: How Goodwin Procter Won Many of Testa’s
Law Partners, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2005, at C1.
40. Issues of gendered identities, expressions and presentations being laden as
they are with assumed or implicit judgment and personalized normative and
emotional responses, it is important to be clear: this article does not assert that
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In this sense, the possibility that a greater ability or willingness to
assimilate into existing organizational gendered expectations is
predictive of relative success within those structures is far from a
radical critique: those who would succeed within existing structures
are well-advised to “fit in” to those structures.41
Of course, fitting into existing social structures and greater
institutional expectations is not an experience unique to women. It is
largely what everyone does at work, it is part of what I do as I present
these ideas and part of what the reader will do in evaluating them. It
is likewise important to emphasize that women who present less
challenge to existing andro-ideals are not engaged in something
nefarious or gender treasonous. This exploration of the implications
of the success of the assimilation model of female liberation is not
premised on an implicit “sell-out” indictment of women who have
succeeded in a discriminatory climate. The fact that some succeed
within a model that may be inherently discriminatory does not mean
that women who do succeed do so to the determent of women who
do not. Nor does this paper suppose that women who succeed are
consciously or unconsciously betraying a mythologically truer version
successful women are more androgynous in their self-presentation, gender-expression
or gendered identity than their less successful counterparts. This article posits only
that the degree to which existing structure privileges movements away from the
subordinate paradigm should not be ignored, but should instead be considered as
part of an ongoing dialectic regarding women’s relative subordination.
41. Render, supra note 9. Moreover, not every workplace situation rewards
female androgyny over femininity, but those which prize femininity in women tend to
do so because value is placed in those contexts on women employees’ attractiveness to
patrons or others. For example, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Jespersen, a
female casino bartender, objected to her employer’s requirement that she wear makeup, a requirement which clearly signaled her employer’s preference for a traditionally
feminine presentation among its women bartenders. 280 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1190 (D.
Nev. 2002), aff’d, 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d
1061 (9th Cir. 2005).
Jespersen sensibly asserted that the forced-make-up
requirement was objectionable because “[i]t is exploitive and perpetuates women’s
roles as sex objects. [She] believe[d] the Defendant’s policy negatively impact[ed]
women by portraying them in this stereotypical manner. She argue[d] that
Defendant should not treat women like ‘Barbie’ dolls.” Id. at 1193. In finding for the
casino, the trial court did not disagree with Jespersen that the requirement was
exploitive or objectionable, holding: “Plaintiff is entitled to disagree with and object
to the means by which Defendant promotes itself and its employees. Yet even if we
agree that Defendant’s policy may not be a step forward in freeing women from
societal stereotypes, it does not convert Defendant’s conduct into unlawful
discrimination.” Id. at 1194 (citing Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F.Supp. 905,
913-14 (D. Nev. 1993) for the principle that making decisions for hiring casino
dealers based on a preference for “Barbie doll” images is not discriminatory).
Another possible motivation for preferring feminine women to androgynous women
in the workplace concerns the desire in an employer to minimize the presence of
“competent” women by preferring “giggling” women, as this ordering leaves
unchallenged internalized hierarchy that women occupy a subordinate sphere of
competency relative to the employer. However, this ordering of femininity in
contrast to competency, coupled with a preference for femininity, rarely bodes well
for the initially preferred women. See Yuracko, supra note 2, at 227.
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of themselves, their gendered identities or expressions, or of
womanhood generally. Instead, it is the supposition of this paper that
women’s “true” gendered identities may express along a spectrum,
which is neither limited nor necessarily informed by their sex.42 It is
also probable that some number of women who succeed are contramodel exceptions—that they have succeeded despite presenting
challenges to andocentric norms, and in so doing they have bested a
system biased against them without particularly complimenting
existing norms.
Whatever account one embraces regarding women on top, the
persistence of an andocentric-assimilation model in the workplace is
significant insofar as it continues to exclude most women from the
dominate power paradigm, and insofar as it fosters preexisting
misogynistic norms which lie at the heart of women’s continued
subordination, while simultaneously obscuring that subordination.43
Moreover, it is this obscuring function that is the central focus of
the discussion here. Many if not most scholars writing about gender
discrimination in the workplace today have identified that the
problem has evolved beyond “first generation” discrimination
predicated on formal biases relating to sex.44 Susan Sturm initially
and persuasively outlined the descriptive framework of “second
generation discrimination”:
Second generation claims frequently involve patterns of interaction
among groups within the workplace that, over time, exclude
nondominant groups. This exclusion is difficult to trace directly to
intentional, discrete actions of particular actors . . . . [Second
generation discrimination] is particularly intractable, because the
participants in the conduct may perceive the same conduct quite
differently. Moreover, behavior that appears gender neutral, when
considered in isolation, may actually produce gender bias when
connected to broader exclusionary patterns.45

Similarly, Orly Lobel describes the gender discriminatory problems
of the “new workplace” as “not the result of a distinct decision to
discriminate but rather of complex practices, including corporate
culture, informal norms, networking, training, mentoring and
evaluation.”46 Thus, the picture of gender discrimination in the
modern workplace is complex and diffuse, often it is described as a
42. See Render, supra note 9.
43. See id.; see also Yuracko, supra note 2, at 227 (stating that partners prefer to
hire deferential women for their firm and yet they tend to promote only those who
are tough and aggressive to the partnership level).
44. Sturm, supra note 2, at 459.
45. Id. at 468-69.
46. Lobel, supra note 19, at 420.
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collection of individual biases rather than a general or even actual
bias against women. Moreover, in this picture of the “new workplace”
there is a lack of malfeasance with respect to gendered outcomes.
There is an absence of an intent to discriminate, and there is the
sense that most system participants genuinely seek solutions to
problems such as the gendered-attrition problem that our
hypothetical BigLaw faces.
But, while the picture of second generation discrimination seems
observationally accurate—and certainly formal gender restrictions are
no longer the primary problem—it seems that the universality and
persistence of gendered treatment and outcomes in workplaces in
which policy-makers sincerely seek to recruit and foster female
employees, requires more of an inquiry into the nature of the gender
bias being enacted in the workplace. The “why women” question—or
as it is refined herein, “why some women” or “why these particular
women”—seems to me to be of great significance in evaluating
approaches that may best resolve the problem that I do believe most
participants do genuinely want to resolve.
But we cannot resolve a discrimination that we have stopped seeing,
and we certainly cannot know which model will better inhibit gender
discrimination at work, if we are unclear what we mean when we say
“gender discrimination.” Rare is it the workplace that fails to recruit
or even under-recruit women, and yet women do not succeed on a
level that is commensurate with that ostensible neutral “equal
opportunity.”47 A handful of women rocket to the top, and most
plateau. Understandably, we have difficulty synthesizing these truths
into a unifying discriminatory theory. Still, as a starting place, it is
worth exploring the degree to which the hierarchical orderings of
gendered identities and expression has not actually been transcended
at all, but have instead remained static while the desirability of sex
diversity has been added to the workplace calculus.
If it were the case that the andocentric ordering of gendered
preferences has in fact remained somewhat static but the element of
the desirability of sex diversity has been added to the employment
calculus, how would this affect women’s relative experiences and
successes in a workforce dominated by an andocentric-assimilation
model? If the model in question defines competence and attendant
cluster qualities in contrast to an individual’s distance from androideals (and assuming again that we live in a social structure in which
sex diversity is desirable), one might expect to see a minority of
women who happen to fall within proximity to andro-ideals benefiting
47. See Patton, supra note 3, at 173 (showing that a majority of female lawyers
work for a private practice firm and still they are underrepresented as partners).
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disproportionately from the model; we would also expect to see
another subset of women who fall anywhere along the gendered
identity spectrum but who are able to approximate andro-ideals
benefits; and on the other end of the spectrum, women who exploit
traditionally misogynistic and subordinating ideals about feminized
women would “succeed” in a manner of speaking. If this model were
the prevailing paradigm, where would that leave most women,
assuming most women are reluctant to settle for the “success”
attendant to objectifying feminization and are unable to approximate
andro-ideals? Following the model to its logical terminus, it would
leave a sliver of women in positions of power, a handful of women in
exploitation-power, and most women in positions of relatively low pay,
respect, and responsibility.
Moreover, if this model were silently but significantly molding the
gendered topography of the workforce, it might too be serving to
obscure its own role in that process and thereby aiding women in
making their peace with the existing gendered inequities. For
example, the model might serve to obscure its overall subordinating
effect by clouding the causal effect that an andocentric definition of
competence and worth has on the choices, options and preferences of
the subordinate gender paradigm. Successful actors within this model
represent false assurance that the powers that be are either “genderblind” or that they have a neutral relative valuation of all gendered
expressions. It is not about prejudice, the andocentric-assimilation
model would hold, it is not about hierarchy, it is not about gender at
all—it is about competence (or an attendant quality). “And we can
prove it: our chairman is a woman! Be competent like the pastelavoidant, and this too could be yours.”48 If inequity in outcomes
48. This may itself sound promising enough to some, but what if an individual is
not able to “be like” the pastel-avoidant simply by avoiding pastels? Are egalitarian
sensibilities satisfied with a definition of competence that also happens to overlap
with traditional valuations of femininity and masculinity, rendering all women initially
handicapped until they are able to rebut the presumption that they secretly like pink?
Twenty years ago andro-assimilation was less closeted, so to speak. See Beverly G.
Kempton, The Language of Clothes, WORKING WOMAN, Sept. 1984, at 157 (reporting
that clothes may help to camouflage a less andro-identified woman as long as she is
not too attractive).
Grant McCracken, assistant professor at the University of Guelph, in Ontario,
Canada, was one of several to seek an answer. His study told us that recent
styles indicate a “changed concept of femaleness.” In addition to still wearing
the radical feminist ‘uniform,’ women are now striving to create an “authority
look” in their workwear, an attempt, he explained, “to isolate certain
symbolic properties of male business clothing and incorporate them into
female fashion.”
McCracken hastened to add that this is not simply imitation in “pursuit of greater
prestige and status.” Quite the contrary; women are being splendidly tactical. They
have mirrored and adapted the concepts of men's wear in the workplace in order to
“appropriate its expressive qualities. The object of this undertaking is to give
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exists, the model might hold, it is because so many women chose not
to play by the rules, they chose not to work hard, they chose to wear
pastels, and they chose to spend their time elsewhere.
However, there is of course both a tautological and an ad hoc
problem with these claims. Tautology first: if the model defines
competence and attendant cluster qualities in contrast to an
individual’s distance from andro-ideals, it should not be surprising to
find that most women compare unfavorably to identically qualified
men. If BigLaw is assigning an important client to someone with a
J.D. from Harvard, there may be several choices. If BigLaw is
assigning an important client to someone with a J.D. from Harvard
who embodies a “proactive” attitude, perhaps wholly associated in the
assigning partner’s mind with maleness, it seems likely that women at
BigLaw are going to taking a beating from the gate. Latin second: if
the model results in disparate treatment and opportunity for women
in such a way that, to return to our hypothetical, our female
associates—each of whom labored for seven years in competitive
educational settings, competed for clerkships, and, like their male
colleagues, spent on average ten to twelve years preparing for this,
their jobs—spend their days filing, faxing, and organizing instead of
brief-writing, researching, and arguing, is it surprising under these
circumstances, that they may eventually prefer to spend their time
elsewhere?49 In other words, the model itself may obscure a causal
relationship between gendered disparate treatment and gendered
professional choices, while hypothesizing that women are just
different, they want different things; the difference just is.50
Another manner in which this model might quietly affect workplace
outcomes is by presenting a paradigm of false alternatives, thereby
businesswomen new credibility, presence and authority in the business world.” Does
this pragmatic, masculine image work? At the moment, more often than not, it does,
or so psychologist Thomas F. Cash's research suggested.
[However] some research disclosed that physical attractiveness can be a
liability for the woman attempting to move from a secretarial job
(“appropriate” for one of her sex) to a managerial position traditionally held
by a man; she is “too feminine,” “too sexy,” in other words, too capricious to
be taken seriously. Turn this inside out and behold the woman who has so
perfected the authority/managerial style that she is seen as threatening, i.e.,
too aggressive.
Id.
49. This is particularly so if they are especially appreciated and needed
“elsewhere.” Cf. Belkin, supra note 33, at 42 (stating that some women are redefining
success in order to achieve a better balance between family and work). While this is
not a paper about disparate child care responsibilities, see generally Lobel, supra note
19, for a thorough discussion.
50. Cf. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 243
(1989) (noting how sex equality is primarily viewed on the basis of gender as
difference, rather than as dominance).
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creating a “fitting in” double bind for women. First, women who fail
to fit in under the andocentric competence test may be concurrently
perceived to be extra-competent at non-analytical, less responsible,
less engaging, detail-oriented administrative work. For example, in
our hypothetical, an andocentric-assimilation reading of the
assignment disparity might be that women are trusted to do the
administrative work because they are better at it. Here, the model
might understand Associate A to be capable of substantive work, but
instead the administrative work must be done, and Associate A is in
possession of a skill set uniquely suited to that work. Or, gendered
expectations being what they are, and Associate A’s workplace options
being what they are, it bothers Associate A less to do the work, so her
temperament is better suited to that work than a male associate’s
might be. Or it bothers the partner less to assign the non-legal work
to her, either because he perceives her to be especially well suited to
it, or because he knows her options to be fewer. In any of the
scenarios Associate A may be seen as an especially good “fit” with the
bad work.
Similarly, women who do meet andocentric expectations of
competence may be rewarded with—to stay within our example—the
better work, but if the norm of andro-idealism remains undisturbed,
those women too will always be playing against a handicap.51 A major
51. Consider Doris Weichselbaumer’s study on workforce gender discrimination
published last year. Doris Weichselbaumer, Is It Sex or Personality? The Impact of
Sex Stereotypes on Discrimination in Applicant Selection, 30 E. ECON. J. 159 (2004).
Dr. Weichselbaumer stated that the purpose of the study was to “[investigate] whether
women have less access to attractive, traditionally male jobs because their
sex-stereotypical personality does not fit the job.” Id. at 160. The object of the study
was to distinguish between plain discriminatory sex selections, such as preferring men
to women, from circumstances in which the employer actually prefers male gendered
qualities over those of “a traditional female.” Id. Dr. Weichselbaumer hypothesized
that women are under represented in traditionally masculine jobs—she identifies the
job of “manager,” by way of example—because employers lack insight into the
relevant gendered personality traits of an applicant, and as a result employers use sex
stereotypes to save on information costs, assigning women traditionally feminine
qualities and men traditionally masculine qualities. Id. at 167. Offering the example
of three equally qualified applicants: a feminine female, a masculine female, and a
man (no further nuance is necessary in the world of the completely internalized
andro-ideal), Dr. Weichselbaumer predicts that the inability of the masculine woman
to communicate her gender identity fluently to the prospective employer will unfairly
disadvantage her vis-a-vis the male applicant:
In a situation of incomplete information, where gender identity is not
observable, the male will receive preferential treatment in a masculine job,
while the two women will be treated the same. This is because the employer
cannot distinguish between the two women. Masculinity is highly valued in
the job, but the masculine female cannot be identified as providing the
required characteristics and suffers statistical discrimination. In a feminine
job, however, where feminine characteristics are required, the masculine
female benefits from statistical discrimination. Although in fact she would be
less suited for the job since she is lacking the feminine characteristics, she will
be treated like the feminine female, because the employer just uses sex as an
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flaw of the assimilation model of female liberation is of course that
even when women are inclined or able to particularly distance
themselves from the inferiority associated with femininity and express
along andro-idealized lines, women will never be as ideal as men,
because the hierarchical preference for an andro-ideal is not only a
preference for a collection of so-called masculine qualities—although
that is reflected—it is also a concordant devaluing, or differently
valuing depending on the context, of the non-maleness of non-males.
It is a power-based preference, a schematic, in which the dominate
paradigm of maleness is, all other things being equal, preferred to the
subordinate paradigm of femaleness. Inhabitants, of the subordinate
paradigm, willingly or otherwise, are rewarded for their relative
proximity to the dominate paradigm, and their value may increase as
they approach the ideal, but they will, as a matter of simple definition,
never reach it.52 In this context women are defeated in the framing
of the question: how like the self is the other? How is this applicant
like me? How does fostering the success of this litigation associate

indicator for gender and expects both to have equivalent personality traits.
Id. at 166 (emphasis in original). Thus, Dr. Weichselbaumer identifies the problem
of sex stereotyping along pro-assimilation lines. She takes care to disaggregate
gendered qualities from sex itself, and then identifies the primary problem of sex
stereotyping—as opposed to gendered expression stereotyping which she
enthusiastically affirms—to be the obstacle it presents to women with the preferred
“masculine” gender identity or expression, stating:
If a woman can demonstrate that she does not correspond to her sex
stereotype and in fact does have the stereotypical personality traits of a man,
she should be treated like a man. A woman with identical human capital and
personality should be equally productive as a man—no other conceivable
variables might determine productivity apart from knowledge and personality
traits. Consequently, she should receive equal treatment. If such an equal
treatment is not observable, we argue, discrimination has been documented.
Id. at 160. However, in Dr. Weichselbaumer’s view, if a woman is not offered the
“manager” job because the employer correctly identifies her as a non-masculine
woman, then discrimination has not occurred. Id. at 176. To explore this hypothesis,
Dr. Weichselbaumer designed a study in which her equally qualified gendered trio
each apply for both a masculine job expected that the masculine woman would fare
better than the feminine woman in what she designated the “masculine” job of
network technician. Id. at 176-77. She also expected the masculine woman would
fare about as well as the male applicant. Id. However, the study showed that while
the masculine female was preferred to the feminine female in the network technician
setting, the man fared much better than either of them. Id. at 173. “From the 117
enterprises tested, [seventy-three] percent contacted the male applicant, [sixty-three]
percent the masculine female and [fifty-eight] percent the feminine female for an
interview.” Id. Moreover, while Dr. Weichselbaumer felt it was not significant—
perhaps because she was not considering the possibility that andro-presentation was
preferred not because the job requires masculine qualities, but because andropresentation more closely approximates the andro-ideal—it is worth noting that the
masculine woman was also slightly preferred to the feminine woman in the
“feminine” job of secretary. Id. at 174.
52. See id. at 172-74 (showing that while the masculine female fared better than
the feminine female in a job interview, the masculine man was still preferred over a
masculine female).
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validate myself, and my own access to relative privilege?
Another manner in which the andocentric-assimilation model may
be skewing views of women’s relative subordination is by perpetuating
the belief that the actual physical immigration of albeit a small
number of women into positions of real power has or will result in the
increased relative valuation of “women” as a category, both because
the powerful women will carry into those jobs their own higher
valuation of women generally, and because their positive intercourse
with men in power will increase the power structure’s valuation of
women generally. This belief might be likened to a “trickle-down”
theory of relative gender empowerment, and as an avenue of access to
genuine increased power for women generally within the hierarchy, it
seems unlikely for a number of reasons. First, and most obviously, it is
possible that we all, including the women who succeed, have
internalized the schema described here. If that is the case, then
physical immigration of women alone is probably not going to be of
overwhelming assistance in reordering the paradigms, particularly if
we remain largely unaware of the subtly gendered nature of the
hierarchy and therefore we do not carry the tools by which to
deconstruct relative gender orderings into our professional
environments. There is no reason to assume that women, who may
themselves fall anywhere on the gendered spectrum and who
themselves operate within the present model, are more likely than
men to devalue andro-norms and prioritize nonandro-norms.53
Further, given their successful navigation of the existing gendered
ordering, women in power have the survivor’s disincentive to decry
the “gender neutral” paradigm.54 Ultimately, whatever set of likely

53. See, e.g., Blanton, supra note 39, at C1 (noting that despite being woman-led,
Goodwin Proctor has a “low ratio of female-to-male partners [that] is typical of large
law firms: Forty of 217 partners are women, and [nineteen] of 128 equity partners, an
elite group with ownership in the firm, are women”). Moreover, the article states that
Lawrence Casey, an attorney who is representing a former Goodwin associate
presently suing the firm for gender discrimination has stated that he “has interviewed
several women attending a legal conference in 2000 who allege that Pisa told an
audience, in effect, ‘women with children were going to have a hard time getting to
the top, that it was not realistic for women to have it all.’” Id. Ms. Pisa has denied
making such statements, but whether such a sentiment can be attributed to a
particular individual, it is hardly a novel idea that for women to succeed within
existing structures they must adapt to them. Men who succeed within the existing
structure overwhelmingly have someone else raising their children. It follows within
an assimilation-model that women wishing to access the same path must either find
wives or forego children.
54. Consider the observations of “mature [women] career lawyers” reflecting on
the relationship between assimilation and the attainment of relative power for
women: “To the extent that women assumed leadership positions, they did so often as
the ‘token woman,’ champions of gender neutrality typical of this generation of
pioneer women lawyers who were encouraged to fit in rather than make waves.”
Reichman & Sterling, supra note 7, at 54.
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complex psychological and circumstantial reasons, there is little
evidence to show that women in power are more likely to promote
other women to positions of power.55 As a result, the promise of the
andocentric-assimilation model that female immigration will resolve
existing disparities if we remain patient seems, at present, largely
illusory.
Finally, perhaps the most important way in which the andocentricassimilation model obscures gender subordination (and thereby
desensitizes women to that subordination) is by failing to present a
locus or narrative of blame. Within this model, both as it functions
and as it is properly understood, there are no villains or villainesses,
there is no law to repeal, there is no court ruling to protest, and
making peace with inequity is easiest when there are no architects of
oppression at which to take aim. For example, in the anecdote that
introduced this piece, the inequity is easily identified as the woman
litigator reveals the truth about women litigators and the bad work,
but the oppressor is not. In our “women litigators” hypothetical,
there is no law that mandates that men and women are assigned
substantively different work—indeed there exists a body of law
proscribing such assignments. There is no law firm plan or policy
enforcing this protocol, nor is there an individual partner or
administrator or even oligarchy who we could ferret out and hold
singularly responsible for the disparity. The firm itself cannot be held
out as a rogue hot-bed of misogynistic preferences—these types of
gendered outcomes are prevalent in law firms.56 Taking the
abstraction further, fingering law firms generally, or the legal
profession in its entirety, also fails to satisfy our narrative need for a
moustache-twirling villain, women faring as they do about as well in
law as elsewhere.57 In our hypothetical scenario, there are no
55. However, there is some evidence. See, e.g., Grace H. Saltzstein, Female
Mayors and Women in Municipal Jobs, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 140, 158 (1986)
(demonstrating that cities with female mayors correlated with an increase in female
employment, part of which may be attributed to the mayor actively promoting the
hiring of women).
56. See Patton, supra note 3, at 173 (providing data on the under-representation
of female partners in law firms); see also Rhode, supra note 4, at 1002-03 (noting that
these gender outcomes are present in various occupations within the legal field); see
also Reichman & Sterling, supra note 7 (revealing the gap in compensation between
men and women extends beyond the legal profession).
57. Equality-wise, women fare better in law than in some other occupations, and
also less well than some other occupations. Also, I would be clear that the use of
women litigators as a hypothetical category of women experiencing disparate
treatment at work is not an attempt to speak about or isolate the particular types of
gendered treatment experienced by women lawyers, which, while an encompassing
important experiential lessons about a subset of women in the workforce, is also a
topic which has been thoroughly explored by a number of scholars. See, e.g., Shelley
Hammond Provosty, DRI Task Force Examines the Status of Women Litigators at Law
Firms, 24 No. 7 OF COUNSEL 5 (2005); Sandy Mastro, Courtroom Bias: Gender
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architects of hierarchical inequity, only adherents.
Moreover, the lack of an epicenter of injustice is magnified by a
growing sense of blamelessness in and among its adherents. The
gendered outcomes speak for themselves, yet instances of second
generation discrimination are “frequently difficult to trace directly to
intentional, discrete actions of particular actors, and might sometimes
be visible only in the aggregate. Structures of decision-making,
opportunity, and power fail to surface these patterns of exclusion, and
themselves produce differential access and opportunity.”58 In this
vision of workplace dynamics, gendered outcomes are less the result
of an intentional systemic desire to suppress the uppity women as they
are the result of a complex set of shifting conscious and unconscious
factors and circumstances.59 But as we adopt this amorphous
understanding of the motivations at play behind the structural
inequities in opportunity and access, we fail to draw the necessary
broad and causal conclusions regarding our residual misogynistic
notions about women and the way these ideas inform both the action
of structures and decision-making. In sum, an extremely complex,
subtle, defuse and variable set of orderings seems to be at work
behind gender disparities. But in the broadest possible sense, in the
pan-historic sense, in the depressed class-wide outcomes sense, and
the norm-entrenching sense, it may still largely boil down to a
collective and deferential preference for the alpha, even in the
absence of a law to that effect.
Discrimination Against Pregnant Litigators, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 155 (2001).
58. Sturm, supra note 2, at 460.
59. In contrast to the simple animus-based discriminatory theory which accounts
for the “wrong” of “first generation” discrimination as the deliberate exclusion of
women, Susan Sturm suggests three possible discriminatory theories which might
account for the “wrong” of second generation gender discrimination:
One such theory would apply to decisions or conditions that violate a norm
of functional, as opposed to formal, equality of treatment. This theory
defines discrimination to include differences in treatment based on group
membership, whether consciously motivated or not, that produce unequal
outcomes. Second generation bias could also violate a norm of equal access,
which defines discrimination to include employment decisions that are
formally fair but functionally biased in favor of the dominant group by using
criteria that advantage one group over another for arbitrary reasons,
meaning reasons that do not advance the articulated goals of the
employment decision. A third possibility is that these subtle, exclusionary
practices violate an antisubordination principle, which itself is a plural
normative category that could include stereotyping, gender policing,
undermining women’s competence, or maintaining gender or racial
hierarchy.
Depending on the context, one or a combination of these discrimination
theories may be implicated. Indeed, aspects of second generation bias
frequently blend with circumstances that themselves may not violate any
current legal norm.
Id. at 473-74 (citations omitted).
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B. If to Schema is Human, then Whether to Schema
is not the Question
However, even if it is the case that a societal androcentrism lies
behind gendered disparate treatment and other gendered outcomes,
the normative implications of such a system are not self-evident. Not
only is it unclear what can be done about it about it given the lack of
an identifiable agent of oppression, it is also not obvious that anything
should be done about it. This lack of obviousness results in part from
a movement away from a hyper-idealized understanding of human
intercourse that presumed society could adopt an indifference to
superficial constructs like gender and race.60 The “even playing field”
workforce ideal presumed on a very concrete level that all other
things would indeed be equal—in the gender-indifferent sense. An
even playing field is meaningless if when you get there, you find that
someone has to be the cheerleader and, nothing personal, but you
are the only one who fits the uniform.61 It was not that the ideal
misunderstood the inherently subordinating role of cheerleader, it
was that the model underestimated the recalcitrance of an ordering
which dictates that someone has to be the quarterback and someone
has to be cheerleader. It underestimated the degree to which
dominance would replicate itself such that actual sex aside, the
dominate paradigm would continue calling the plays. In this way, the
hyper-idealized model envisioned that an absence of gendered
hierarchy would follow the deconstruction of gender roles, and in
this, it failed to adequately understand the complexity and persistence
of hierarchy.
Increasingly the intricacy and omnipresence of our social
hierarchies has been a topic of observation and discussion among
social scientists and policy advocates. Social scientists explain that
processing, categorizing and ordering is the manner by which we
distinguish between wives and hats, and how we decide which to save
when the house is on fire.62 Intuitively we understand that our
concept of reality is relational, compartmental, and structured around
schematics which are necessarily hierarchical as are our organizing
cognitive processes, and even the processes by which we describe
those processes. It may be unrealistic to expect our social evaluations
60. And in presuming this, presume too that race and gender were superficial
constructs.
61. Other critiques of neutrality are similarly apt here. For example, an even
playing field is useless if you can never get there because you have nowhere to leave
the kids.
62. See OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT 20
(Touchstone 1998) (1970) (explaining how our mental processes involve
classification and organization).
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and intercourse to be divorced from these mappings and schema.
Looking through the long lens of history, it is impossible to ignore
the prevalence of Caesars and chiefs, slaves, and untouchables, and
according to Jerry Kang, a look at the present snap-shot of social
cognitive studies would seem to confirm the inevitability thesis.63 As
he explains it:
We employ schemas out of necessity. Our senses are constantly
bombarded by environmental stimuli, which must be processed,
then encoded into memories (short- and/or long-term) in some
internal representation. Based on that representation of reality, we
must respond. But we drown in information. Perforce we simplify
the data stream at every stage of information processing through
the use of schemas . . . . To be clear, this most basic process
operates not only on inanimate objects, such as chairs or bananas,
but also on human beings. When we encounter a person, we
classify that person into numerous social categories, such as gender,
(dis)ability, age, race, and role.64

This picture of social hierarchy may prove initially discouraging
from a feminist standpoint, in part perhaps because of the problem
presented by the fabled past, alluded to above. Our most theoretical
egalitarianism operated implicitly from an expectation that separate
gendered paradigms might be valued equally in the same context
followed. This ideal is distinct from valuing the utility of different
qualities equally—i.e. valuing women’s nurturing as it is suiting to
child-rearing as much as we value men’s assertiveness as it relates to
the board room. Instead, the most ideal vision of gender equality
imagined that the concepts of “man” or “woman” would have no
particular bearing on the concepts of nurturing or assertive or childrearer or board member. There was a supposition that the categories
could be hollowed out and rendered meaningless, and that once this
process was complete, previously gender-stratified people would be
equal. In this vision, equality of category overlaps largely with
immateriality of category, which itself folds neatly into indifference to
category, which began to sound a lot like sameness of category. But if
this hyper-idealized picture of an absence of social hierarchy reflects
an inaccurate or overly simplistic account of human cognition—if we
must order what we categorize, and categorize what we process, is it
63. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494 (2005).
64. Id. at 1499. Professor Kang describes the phenomena of “agentic backlash” in
the context of a gender study as an example of a way in which implicit bias against
women affects interpretive bias. The study as he describes it (find this primary
source) adopts an understanding that bias may be identified when subjects
misunderstand the “match” between the agentic candidate and the agentic job,
thereby replicating the implicit biases towards sex-disaggregation and assimilation
much that way as Dr. Weichselbaumer’s study. Id. at 1517.
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realistic to expect gender “equality”—in the indifference sense—amid
the reality of persisting and discernable gendered differences?65 Even
if the categories of “men” and “women” are rendered meaningless,
actual people and their varying embodiments of the qualities
previously tethered to those categories will continue to live in the
same places on the hierarchical schematic.
Given this theoretical picture, it is perhaps a fair question to
wonder what is wrong with leaving people and their varying
embodiments of gendered qualities where they presently lie. Much
skepticism has been directed to the concept of gendered equality,
particularly as it veers near sameness, and if there ever was a scholastic
captain of the gender-sameness ship, few scholars remain on board.66
For that matter, much skepticism and a full parade of horribles has
assembled around the concept of “equality” itself as a societal goal,
equality in these dialogues frequently flanked with an individualitycrushing homogeny, and other assorted ills at the end of which
marches the iconic threat of a “wholly centralized” and entirely
intrusive government.67 Equality within this stream of reasoning is
either a very silly or a very bad idea. At worst, it stands in opposition
to diversity, autonomy, individualized choices, and even principles of
anti-subordination.68 At best it is an absurdly paternal or hubristic
account of humanity, failing to account for the fact that people
possess differing innate abilities, goals, and subjective self-interests.
To quote Catharine MacKinnon: “on the first day, difference was; on
the second day, a division was created upon it; on the third day,
irrational instances of dominance arose.”69 But if indeed gendered
difference is (even disaggregated as it may be from sex), and if
someone has to be on top, who is to say that in preferring an andro-

65. Here the concept of “gendered” as opposed to gender (e.g. sex) is important.
“Gendered” here is used to capture variances in gendered qualities, identities and
expressions.
66. It is interesting to compare queer activists’ struggle with the push-pull
dilemma of sameness and difference with the heterosexual paradigm referential. See,
e.g., FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST
CONTROVERSY (Edward Stein ed., 1990).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (striking down a
federal law for victims of gender motivated violence).
68. For a perspective on equality in tension with autonomy, see Martin Shapiro,
Father and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in THE
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Blash ed., 1983)
(comparing the Warren Court to the Burger Court). For a perspective of equality in
tension with principles of anti-subordination, see JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE
THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 15 (1999) (theorizing that the
gender-neutrality principle in Equal Protection jurisprudence has worked to
exacerbate rather relieve women’s subordination).
69. MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 220.
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ideal we have crowned the wrong king?70 Adding to the problem of
conceptualizing equality in a hierarchical schema is the
uncomfortable acknowledgment that in walling off gender and race—
the two boxes that we have most often collectively determined to
protect—we are swinging with a terrifically blunt instrument. In a real
sense our hierarchical schema appears to function more as a
delicately calibrated complex logic game, in which qualities and
combinations of qualities are relatively valued and valued again
differently in differing contexts. The qualities which are accorded
echelon-identifying weight in this game certainly include the
categorical criteria outlined in Title VII—particularly as these are
often coarsely used as proxies for the substantive qualities such as
competence and intelligence—but significant too are the intricate
qualities that signal not only membership in the broader classes, but
which inform relative worth within those structures.71 These include
qualities that concern the package (skin tone, height, weight), and
the person (gender-expression), and the personality (quality and tone
of voice), to name just a few. Moreover, if these qualities too can be
outcome predictive, how do we determine which of these hierarchies
are tolerable and which are not? This is a difficult question with
answers that must be culled and synthesized from democratic theory,
political philosophy, social equilibriums, and jurisprudential doctrine.
The simple answer for the purpose of the discussion here is that in
terms of suppressing oppressive private hierarchies, immutability plus
a history of subordination is where it has come out.72 It is not
intuitively obvious that immutability plus a history of subordination is
where the line should be drawn, nor do they together comprise a
wholly determinative criterion.
For example, does weight
discrimination carry with it a history of subordination?73 What about
disability?74 What about height?75 Is beauty super-ordinate?76 Is
70. This is not to suggest that the persistence of social hierarchies dictates that
one or another gendered paradigm must dominate.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2004).
72. This answer is not meant to minimize the importance of the question; a full
treatment of the issues concerned exceeds the scope of this discussion.
73. See generally Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in
America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645 (2004) (evaluating the societal and legal impact of the
obesity epidemic); Elizabeth Kristen, Addressing the Problem of Weight
Discrimination in Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 57 (2002) (describing the extent and
nature of weight-based employment discrimination).
74. See generally Lisa A. Montanaro, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Will the
Court Get the Hint? Congress’ Attempt to Raise the Status of Persons with Disabilities
in Equal Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621 (1995) (arguing that Congress did not
intend to give individuals with disabilities suspect or quasi-suspect class under the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
75. See Nicola Persico et al., The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor
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sexual orientation immutable?77 In drawing these boundaries, bias is
imposed, hierarchies of oppression are created, and relative
valuations are entrenched. It is not a perfect standard nor is it ever
perfectly applied.
Nonetheless, and setting aside the factor of immutability for the
present, the relevance of a history of subordination does provide
insight into an essential lynch pin to conceptualizing gender equality
in a hierarchical schema.
If our erstwhile hyper-idealized
egalitarianism relied too much on sameness and reflected too little on
hierarchy, at the other end of the egalitarianist spectrum—the more
world-weary antisubordination end which never underestimates
hierarchy—we have focused too little on liberty.78 Focusing as
Market Outcomes: The Case of Height, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1019, 1021 (2002) (stating
that short men earn thirteen percent less than tall men and that by comparison, black
men earn fifteen percent less than white men).
76. See Karen Zakrzewski, The Prevalence of “Look”ism in Hiring Decisions: How
Federal Law Should be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the
Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 431, 431-33 (2005) (illustrating the problems
inherent in workplace appearance discrimination).
77. See generally WAYNE R. DYNES, HOMOSEXUALITY: A RESEARCH GUIDE (1987).
78. These days, many people are talking about liberty the way people used to talk
about equality, including perhaps most notably five of the Big Nine. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (holding that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), “misapprehended the claim of liberty” presented there and extolled the
presumption of liberty inherent in our constitutional scheme). On the liberty wagon,
the Court held inter-alia that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct.” Id. at 562.
The Court also stated that,
[Petitioners’] right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.
“It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter.” Had those who drew and ratified the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment
known the components of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have
been more specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew
times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws
once though necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in
their own search for greater freedom.
Id. at 578-79 (citations omitted); see also Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s
Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW
2002-2003 21, 21 (Cato Inst. Ctr. for Const’l Stud. ed., 2003) (explaining how the
Lawrence majority did not protect a right of privacy but protected a liberty right);
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
3-4 (2004) (defending the constitutional doctrine of originalism from a libertarian
perspective and presenting an outline for understanding the constitution to embody
a presumption of liberty). So much has “liberty” become an “it” dialectic, that a few
years ago Rebecca Brown cleverly dubbed it “the new equality.” See Rebecca L.
Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1495-96 (2002) (supporting
a claim that the egalitarian-minded generally have laid too little claim to the utility of
liberty-based arguments, particularly where equality-based claims fail to redress
representational failures). Nonetheless, this present paper’s focus is on a decidedly
less pragmatic deconstruction of the equality-liberty, and one which is applied
particularly to the gender context. The arguments presented here are not offered to
participate in the liberty-renaissance, but instead to support the idea that the equality-
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antisubordinationists have on the falseness of self-determination
within a system that defines the subordinate, we have wandered away
from an understanding that all allocations of power being relational,
equality in a hierarchy at best means being as self-determined as other
people are, being “as free” as the dominate paradigm. Working in an
inherently relational model, it is important to resist one’s exclusion
from the referential, and to continue to object to that exclusion
because with those objections the subordinate paradigm reaffirms its
commitment to self-define and reassesses the definition accorded it.79
With those resistances, objections, and reassessments lays the sole
hope for a systematic reordering—and in this sense, for real change.
Yet at the same time, it is important to bear in mind that selfdetermination is not an inscrutable concept. It in fact resides at
certain places that we can drive to, assuming we can find a sitter. It
lives in places like our local polling precinct, our schools, and our
workplaces. At these three gates in particular—suffrage, education,
and access to work—the subordinate paradigm’s autonomy interests
coalesce with greatest force against society’s competing obligations
and interests. That there are other important autonomy concerns
and egalitarian aspirations for any minority paradigm is beyond
question. But without “as much” economic independence, “as much”
education, and “as much” suffrage as the dominate paradigm, we
cannot meaningfully access them.80 In contexts where inequality
implicates self-determination, “equality” begins to be inexorably
linked to liberty. It is at these autonomy intersections that the
concept of “equality” of classes (which are comprised of individuals
with differing innate abilities, goals, and subjective self-interests)
within an inherently contextual scheme begins to make sense.
Moreover, at this juncture in feminist discourse, the intersection of
the factors discussed above (the persistence of subordinate gendered
construct and gendered difference; the imperfection of the criteria by
which we have decided to protect some classes and not others; the
lack of a locus of blame for gendered outcomes; and the possibility
that human orderings may be inherently hierarchical) tend to cloud
the imperative of resisting the present andocentric ordering, making
its discriminatory impact easy or even desirable to ignore. We stop, in
liberty dichotomy actually is a false dichotomy in the gender context, particularly in
the case of disparate treatment at work.
79. See MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 241 (noting that the first task of a
movement for social change is to face one’s situation and name it). Moreover, the
need to self-define so that devalued gendered paradigms may be unshackled is as
acute as it was when MacKinnon first introduced us to the concept.
80. Here, “as much suffrage” is not used in respect to sheer numbers, but in terms
of the subordinate paradigm’s vote counting as much as the dominate paradigm’s.
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a real sense, urging the inhibition of gendered outcomes because we
are no longer certain that we want them to be interrupted. Maybe we
want difference to be facilitated, maybe that is what “equality” means
in the gender context. Maybe we have to settle for or we should
embrace separate spheres because in an apples and oranges context,
it is better to succeed as an apple than to fail as an orange. Maybe we
have to chose among the relegated options, and make our peace with
our choices, because it seems impossible to restructure so complex a
set of social hierarchies.
In the ensuing relativist fog it is easy to lose perspective, but here
women are fortunate to have so solid and proximate a history to
ground us. It is helpful in this respect to recall that eighty-five years
ago women were not permitted to vote in this country,81 that we were
not educated routinely until about forty years ago,82 and forty-two
years ago it was permissible to refuse us work.83 We decry the male
referential, the andro-ideal, and we should, but we should know too
that when power is involved (and when is it not) equality for the
subordinate paradigm means, at best, having “as much” structural
access to power as the dominate paradigm has. And in this initial step
we still have a long way to go.
C. Discrimination as Tyranny: Gender and the Liberty Axis
As she stood trial for casting an illegal vote, Susan B. Anthony
famously said, “Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God.”84 The
religious implications aside, she framed the issue in a manner that
many modern feminists have often moved away from: she understood
the issue of women’s “equality” to be a liberty concern, and she
understood the disenfranchisement of women to be a tyranny. Now
granted Anthony was dealing with the state’s suppression of her vote,
and the state as a tyrant is a familiar picture. Also, voting itself evokes
classically revolutionary drama, tea in harbors and so forth. But
Anthony was seeking the right to vote—the contra-constitutional right
to vote, it must be noted—in a state where other people could vote.
Hers was both an egalitarian demand and a democratic crisis, the
denial of which implicated her autonomy in a manner that is so
painfully obvious that we barely perceive it to be separate from her
stake in equality. Yet it is separate. If Anthony were seeking to vote
81. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (2000) (providing that women
gained the right to vote in 1920).
82. Id. (detailing history of discrimination against women).
83. Title VII was enacted in 1964.
84. This quote is from the trial of Susan B. Anthony on the charge of illegal
voting. BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS 346 (1999).
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despite the fact that she failed to meet an age or citizenship
requirement, hers would be a claim to autonomy only. But instead,
Anthony was demanding to do what a man in her place would be free
to do, and in this way she linked her expectation of freedom to the
freedom afforded the dominate paradigm. She expected to be as free
to vote as a man in her place would be.
However, in the example of the age or citizenship requirement we
may see a whirling cyclone of collapsing principles: could not
Anthony’s hypothetical citizenship claim be recast in the liberty
dialectic as a demand to be “as free” as a citizen? Many readers
perhaps soared off the page from the cusp of this slippery slope. But
the answer is, well, no. Here is where it is essential to recall the
discussion, at Part II.B, of the difficult question of which potentially
subordinating hierarchies should be inhibited by the democratic
collective and which should not.85 This question must always be
answered first in the context of deciding whether exercises of
power—either by the state, or by individuals, or oligarchies—will be
checked or go unchecked. The answers may change and probably
will change “[a]s the Constitution endures, [and] persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom,”86 but so far we have decided that we will not abide
tyrannies which are directed at a class that is organized around an
immutable quality, when that class also carries with it a history of
subordination. Thus as to Anthony’s hypothetical claim within our
present structure: it is not permissible to deny her the vote because
she is a woman although it would be permissible to deny her the vote
were she not a citizen.
If the foregoing Anthony analysis seems complicated in light of its
intuitively obvious result, unhappy news lies ahead. Unfortunately for
those who prefer determinative outcomes, the suffrage example is as
simple as it gets because few “liberties” and few “equalities” operate as
a toggle—on or off—in the way that suffrage does. We know well by
now that most liberties and equalities slide along a continuum, their
content defined by tensions and contrasts. In the anti-discrimination
context, much thought has been devoted to understanding equality as
it is in tension with individual freedom, and reconciling that
85. Yes, there will be hierarchies of oppression, but there will be hierarchies of
oppression regardless of one’s rendering of these issues. The point is that we must do
our best, but we must decide, because in not deciding which hierarchies to interrupt
and which to not interrupt, we decide too. Cf. BARNETT, supra note 78, at 22
(discussing the tension between the nineteenth century progressive movement,
through which the legislature enacted restrictions on economic activity as well as
“morals” legislation, and subsequent Supreme Court decisions holding otherwise by
citing “liberty” interests).
86. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
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tension.87 Where liberty has been considered in this context, it has
been considered largely as a means for capturing desirable outcomes
that elude a rights-base discourse. Much of this equality-liberty
dichotomy, particularly of late, has centered roughly on a New
Deal/civil rights versus Federalism/anti-regulatory framework, the
substance and relative merit of which will be discussed in greater
depth in Part III. For the moment, it is sufficient to consider the
accuracy of the dichotomy itself. Is “equality” in a hierarchical
schema inherently in tension with liberty? In the interest of
preserving the possibility that the reader might reach the end of this
piece within her lifetime, the inquiry is here limited to: is gender
equality in inherent and particular tension with individual autonomy?
Consider the following rendering of the dichotomy:
In [the 1980s], Americans seemed, for the first time since the New
Deal, deeply divided about the proper relationship between citizens
and the government. Shapiro had forecast that division, noting the
radical opposition between a perspective that the government
should compensate social, political, and economic underdogs until
true equality was reached and a perspective that combined, in a
‘conservative political philosophy,’ a commitment to the autonomy
and privacy dimensions of individual freedom with aggressive
definitions of the constitutional principles of separation of powers
and federalism.88

So in the broadest sense, the debate has long pitted autonomy
interests of the-would be discriminator against the public value of
repairing class-based distributive inequities. Gender equality falls into
this celebrated divide between government intervention into private
autonomy, and the “compensat[ion] of social, political, and economic
underdogs”89 primarily by way of Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination by private actors in the work place.90 Title VII itself is
able to reach private conduct by way of the Commerce Clause.91 The
Commerce Clause, therefore, is the primary route by which concern
for gender equality is in “tension” with private orderings, and so it is
87. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 78.
88. See G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 1089, 1154-55 (2005) (analyzing Martin Shapiro’s equality-liberty dichotomy);
see also Shapiro, supra note 68, at 219 (illustrating the tensions between “hard
choices over freedom versus equality”).
89. White, supra note 88, at 1155.
90. See infra Part III (presenting a brief consideration of the constitutionality of
this particular gendered preference inhibition).
91. See U.S. CONT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to regulate
interstate commerce); see also Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive
Theory of Legislative History, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1469 (2003) (explaining that
Congress based its authority to regulate workplace discrimination in the Commerce
Clause).
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here that gender meets with autonomy-based flack, most of which is
directed via federalism at the aggregation principle.92 The resolution
of those federalism/aggregation arguments is not paramount here,
but what is important within this discussion is understanding that
Title VII’s inhibition of gendered hierarchies does not begin to touch
the places where most of our “private” gendered interactions occur.
It does not regulate gendered hierarchies in all the important aspects
and areas of our lives outside of our professional lives.93 It only
touches that one place where the potential for economic selfsufficiency resides: work.94
Therefore, the principle of inhibiting gendered tyrannies only
significantly burdens private conduct where private tyrannies would
otherwise threaten women’s access to economic self-sufficiency.
Where the private-actor-employer would have treated women in a
manner that did not violate Title VII, then his conduct has not been
coerced. Where the private-actor-employer is forced to comply with
Title VII in contradiction to his autonomous preferences, his
unregulated preferences would otherwise serve to threaten the ability
of women, as a class, to access economic self-sufficiency. Is this
“tension” really a dichotomy in which all the liberty interests reside
with the private actor-employer while women’s relative autonomy
remains unimplicated?
It depends on one’s conception of liberty. To begin a discussion of
the liberty implications of nondiscriminatory access to work, it is
probably necessary, in light of the times, to make clear that the
argument which follows is not a bid for women’s piece of the
proverbial pie.95 This is not a capitalism-as-political philosophy
92. See, e.g., White, supra note 88.
93. Of course to many, this is a failure of the civil rights model. See discussion
infra Part III. It is worth noting too that serious “private conduct” regulation concerns
are not implicated by our current method of inhibiting gender-bias in the other two
areas identified herein as essential gateways of liberty: education and suffrage.
Gender-bias in the education context is inhibited by Title IX, which for good or ill
offers a state action “hook.” See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2004). Suffrage of course
won its own amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1.
94. This paper will not address issues that have been ably addressed elsewhere
concerning the relative valuation, benefits of, and potentially hardwired gendered
nature of unpaid work disproportionably or traditionally done by women. See
generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (arguing for a prioritization of the
mother-child dyad and public support for the unpaid work of child-rearing); ANN
CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE
WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (2001) (arguing that the very necessary work of
mothers has yet to truly earn our respect).
95. Discriminatory treatment (or disparate treatment) and discriminatory access
to work, while themselves separate concepts, are used here interchangeably in that
they are both stages of the same wrong, and are both the product of the andocentricideal model. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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argument. It is not an argument that confuses free markets with
personal autonomy, or wealth-access with freedom. Nor is it a Marxist
argument, premised on an idea of autonomy which is connected to a
woman’s ownership of her own labor. It is an argument about relative
freedom in an inherently hierarchical schematic. The premise of the
argument is that if work is the avenue by which we get the things we
need to live, then a gender-bias which systemically disadvantages
women in terms of finding sustaining, meaningful work and keeping
that work diminishes women’s freedom relative to the freedom of
non-women.96 Discriminatory treatment at work means women have
fewer choices regarding how and whether they are educated, where
and with whom they live, whether they have children, and the manner
in which their children are raised. It is also means women have less
choice about the apportionment of their time in accordance with the
dictates of their internal lives, choices, for example, regarding the
amount of their finite time which will be spent with others, with
avocations, with themselves. If work is a gateway to relative power in
our present power structure, then it is essential that women, who as a
class already occupy a subordinate power position, should be at least
as free as non-women are to access it directly.
Particularly, in the present, Vikki Schultz’s writing in 2000
described with eloquence the non-economic, psychological, and
spiritual significance of work:
People need more than money or property: We need life projects.
We need goals and activities to which we can commit our hearts,
minds, and bodies. We need to struggle with our capacities and our
limits, in sustained ways in stable settings. We need to work
alongside others in pursuit of common goals. We need to feel that
we are contributing to something larger than ourselves and our
own families.97

Professor Schultz’s point is still well taken today, but in our present
cultural moment as the dominate paradigm pushes more aggressively
towards the private enforcement of public values, nondiscriminatory
access to work is not only something that we may need to be fulfilled
as human beings, it is something that we must have in order to
participate in a privately ordered system which is largely replacing
public discourse and regulation. In the age when the Renew Deal
looms on the horizon, it is more essential than ever that women
ensure they have structural access to “as much” as non-women of

96. Also, this is not an affirmative claim for women to find meaningful or
sustaining work. It is an argument that women must have as much claim to finding
meaningful or sustaining work as non-women.
97. Vikki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1928 (2000).
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whatever currency will stand in for autonomy and power within the
potentially new “private” paradigm.98 We must be vigilant in tying our
fates to those who cut the pie, not because pie itself is inherently
good, but because otherwise we lose our relative say in how it should
be cut. If private is the new public, and the new leviathan is less the
actual government and more a tyrannus-mercatus, then
nondiscriminatory access to relative power within that system is
essential to self-determination. It is about participating in our own
governance, no less than Susan Anthony’s own fight. In this sense,
disparate treatment at work is a liberty concern.
The introduction of this paper described the liberty interest at stake
here in terms of the degree to which women are as free as our male
colleagues are to find work and to find meaning in our work, to
procreate or not, and, if we choose, to stand alone. Is this conception
of the liberty interest at sake for women at work merely rhetorical
flourish, or does employment particularly intersect with gender in our
culture in a way that is concrete and instrumental in terms of
accessing basic autonomies? Is it possible that gendered-bias has
affected and continues to affect workplace outcomes such that
women’s relative freedom to choose to engage in intimate
relationships or to have children is affected?
Consider, for example, that “[forty-nine percent] of women over
[forty] who earn more than [one hundred thousand dollars] a year
are childless. That compares with [nineteen percent] of men in the
same category. And lest you assume that these women chose the life
they’re living, only [fourteen percent] said they had not wanted
children.”99 We have concentrated much on what it costs women to
bear children when they do not want to, but we have considered too
little what it costs women not to bear children when they do want to.
Choosing between engaging work (or for many women, economic
self-sufficiency of any sort) and children is a Hobson’s choice that
men in this culture do not face. As important as autonomy is with
respect to decisions concerning intimate relationships, how does the
fact that single women are one hundred percent more likely to live in
poverty than single men translate into respective liberties?100 If
98. See generally Lobel, supra note 19.
99. HEWLETT, supra note 17.
100. Karen Christopher et al., Gender Inequality in Poverty in Affluent Nations:
The Role of Single Motherhood and the State, in CHILD WELL-BEING IN MODERN
NATIONS 199, 207 (Vleminkcx, K. & Smeeding, T.M. eds., 2001) (presenting data
which showed that in all countries except Sweden and France, the single women’s
poverty figure was one hundred percent higher than men’s). Also, lest this variance
be attributed to the persistent assumption that single women have more children
than single men, consider that,
Single father families are less likely to be poor and these fathers are more
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statistics like that bear out, then to what degree do gender
discriminatory aspects of women’s ability to access work affect
women’s relative ability to stand alone—to be economically
unindentured to a parent or a partner or the state itself—particularly
in light of the fact that a central aspect of the long history of women’s
subordination in this country has revolved around women’s ability to
escape legally enforced intimate servitudes and access direct power
through work.101
And what about our hypothetical women litigators? How has
gender-bias within an ostensibly neutral power structure constructed
an obstacle to their ability to find meaningful work and to find
meaning in their work? After years of study and training, how many
of them will leave private practice, and how many more will leave law
altogether? Were those years of study and training an invitation down
to a road that ultimately leads nowhere? And, importantly, if we
shared this parable with women law school applicants upon receipt of
their applications, would it affect their decision to write that big
tuition check?
II. THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN INHIBITING PRIVATE
HIERARCHICAL PREFERENCES
Catherine MacKinnon famously stated that “feminism has no theory
of the state.”102 Deborah Rhode likewise observed in 1994 that “the
state does not occupy a central role in feminist jurisprudence. Most
political treatments of the state have had little to say about gender,
just as most feminist theory about gender has been uninterested in
conceptual approaches to the state.”103 Ideas of a feminist theory of

likely to be in the paid labor force than female-headed families and
single-mothers. However, single father families tend to be poorer and have
lower labor force participation than married fathers . . . . Single fathers have
fewer children than married fathers, but more than single mothers.
KIRK BLAIR, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY EXTENSION FACT SHEET, SINGLE, CUSTODIAL
FATHERS, http://ohioline.osu.edu/hyg-fact/5000/5310.html (last visited Feb. 5,
2006).
102 This should be apparent, but the word servitude in this sense is used to
communicate that women previously did not have the choice to stand alone
economically. This is not to imply that the women who have other options, but
nonetheless choose not to work outside the home, are engaged in some form of
intimate servitude. Also, Dorothy E. Roberts writes with respect to servitude to the
state. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: LowIncome Mothers’ Decisions About Work at Home and in the Market, 44 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1029, 1032-35 (2004) (observing the manner in which welfare reform has
dictated choices for poor women).
102. MACKINNON, supra note 50, at 157.
103. Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1181
(1994).
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the state have followed, many of them good ideas.104 But the project
of viewing the state through the lens of feminist theory can be
problematic, in that feminism is a contextual, responsive theory—it is
a theory about what has happened to women, what is happening to
women, what should happen to women, and why it should happen
(here enters those theories of broader application). Thus, our
feminism, modern American feminism, is in many ways a product of
our particular state, because the story of what has happened to
women here—which informs our theories of what should happen—
occurred within this particular set of organizing principles, with its
attendant and unique advantages and limitations. That is not to say it
lacks broader application by analogy to other contexts, or that our
feminism is not itself informed by theories of broader application: on
the contrary. But our feminism directly applied to a matriarchy (it
could happen) would make little sense. So this paper does not offer a
feminist theory of the state, it merely considers existing structures
within this state from a feminist perspective.
Still, in the course of evaluating structures within a state, it may be
helpful to sketch a vision of the basic obligations of that state, if only
to establish a framework within which critiques or advocacies can be
evaluated. Here, our republic, with its Bill of Rights and separation of
powers, is arguably a liberal democracy and while a consideration of
the obligations of a liberal democracy are certainly far beyond the
scope of this discussion, in the interest of finding a rudimentary place
to begin a conversation about whether the state should regulate
gender discrimination in the workplace, it may be useful to posit that,
among other things, liberal democracies are supposed to protect
individual autonomy and self-determination. It follows that, generally
speaking, when self-determination is imperiled by actors, public or
private, a liberal democracy is obliged—to some degree—to protect
individual liberty by disrupting the operation of those oppressions.105
104. See, e.g., Margaret A. Baldwin, Public Women and the Feminist State, 20
HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 47, 48 (1997) (analyzing the roles of “public women” and
“private women”); Karen Knop, Borders of the Imagination: The State in Feminist
International Law, 38 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 15, 15 (1994) (contending that the
rigid thinking of many feminists hinders their imagination).
105. See IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 30 (1999) (discussing democratic
“oppositionalism" which concerns dimensions of democracy that have to do with
resistance to “arbitrary hierarchy and domination”). For an excellent account of this
theory and its account of the role of a democratic state in inhibiting private
subordination, see generally David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 1699 (2005). David Sklansky describes the history of this theory of democracy:
[Democrats, in the theory of democratic oppositionalism] are driven less by a
utopian vision than by the conviction that certain existing and unjustified
forms of domination should be abolished. There is a long history of viewing
this leveling impulse as the core of democracy. Tocqueville, for example,
thought the democracy he found exemplified in America was first and
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When the oppressive actor is the state itself, this idea is less
controversial. Protecting individual liberty from the potential tyranny
of the state was evidently on the forefront of the founding fathers’
thoughts, as well as on the tip of their quills. However, the question
of whether and to what degree the state can or should step in when
private (as in non-state) power is used in a discriminatory manner is
less easily conceptualized or resolved.
For example, when Ollie at Ollie’s Barbeque prefers not to serve
black customers inside his establishment, Ollie is privately enforcing
his private racial hierarchy. The degree to which the state can or
should impose a different world-view on Ollie—essentially reordering
by legal mandate the racial hierarchy that Ollie prefers—is not selfevident. Similarly, if Ollie decides he prefers not to hire women
cashiers—perhaps because in his subconscious gendered ordering he
has unwittingly associated good math skills with men and poor math
skills with women—should the state through the collective action of
legislation or the counter-majoritarian action of judicial mandate be
permitted to second guess Ollie’s ideas about men and women and
math? Or should Ollie’s gender preference, which disadvantages
women, be permitted to stand? What if Ollie is Wal-Mart?106
A. Should the State Play a Role in the Regulation of
Private Tyrannies?
In inhibiting discriminatory gender preferences, the state
necessarily reaches into the presumptively autonomous zone of an
individual’s private conduct and reorders it.107 Whether we think the
state should intervene in the example of gender discrimination in the
foremost a matter of “equality of condition[s]”—and, more precisely, a
matter of sweeping aside the powers and privileges of monarchs and
aristocrats. Lincoln famously drew on the same idea when he tied democracy
to ending slavery: “As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master. This
expresses my idea of democracy. Whatever differs from this, to the extent of
the difference, is no democracy.” And when W.B. Gallie identified
democracy a half-century ago as an “essentially contested concept,” he argued
that what held the concept together was “a long tradition (perhaps a number
of historically independent but sufficiently similar traditions) of demands,
aspirations, revolts and reforms of a common anti-inegalitarian character.”
The core use of the term democracy, Gallie suggested, was to invoke “certain
political aspirations which have been embodied in countless slave, peasant,
national, and middle-class revolts and revolutions, as well as in scores of
national constitutions and party records and programs”—aspirations that
were “centered in a demand for increased equality” and were advanced
against regimes committed to prolonging “gross forms of inequality.”
Id. at 1803-04 (citations omitted).
106. “Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in the world.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
107. Private here is used in the non-state ordered sense, not in the public/private
dichotomy sense.
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workplace which is predicated on a complex set of potentially
subconscious or at least unintentional andocentric preferences, as is
suggested herein, largely depends on a number of factors beginning
with the degree to which we think that andocentric gender
preferences offend other principles which we hold in high regard. If
we determine, for example, that unchecked andocentric gender
preferences offend notions of egalitarianism which we hold in high
regard, we may be inclined to advocate for the state to intervene to
some degree and in some instances. If we believe that unchecked
andocentric gender preferences in fact imperil important liberty/selfdetermination concerns, as this paper suggests, we may similarly be
inclined to advocate for the state to intervene to some degree and in
some instances.
On the other hand, if we find unchecked
andocentric gender preferences inoffensive, or normatively neutral in
the grand scheme of things, we may be less interested in seeing the
state stick its oar into private preferences. If we hold efficiency in
particularly high regard, or rights exercised against the state in special
esteem, we may find the regulation of gendered hierarchies to be less
appealing, and so forth.108
It is doubtful that it will come as a surprise to the reader at this
point in the journey that this paper nurtures the perspective that
unchecked andocentric gender preferences harm women as a class in
a way that the state should care about. This article assumes the

108. A related question to be considered concerns whether a particular state can
reach the private conduct—that is, is the particular state in question constrained by
an expression prohibition or a lack of authority to reach the particular conduct in
question? With respect to our state and the gender discrimination considered here,
there are actually several schools of though bearing on the question of whether our
state can reach it. There is a version of the federalism critique, which holds that at
least the federal branch of the state cannot reach the private discrimination because it
lacks authority to do so under the Commerce Power or any other enumerated power.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-19 (2000) (holding that the
Commerce Clause did not grant Congress the ability to enact the Violence Against
Women Act because it did not regulate an activity that affected interstate commerce).
Others would argue that Title VII is an appropriate exercise of the Commerce Power
and therefore our state can reach this conduct if it opts to, which it has. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey A. Mandell, Comment, The Procedural Posture of Minimum Employee
Thresholds in Federal Antidiscimination Statutes, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1062
(2005) (arguing that by basing Title VII in its Commerce Clause power, Congress
avoided potential claims of unconstitutionality). Still others would argue that the
authorization to inhibit the gender hierarchies described herein originates in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that this provision not only
authorizes state intervention to inhibit private tyrannies, but when coupled with the
democratic imperative that the state inhibit private tyrannies when those tyrannies
construct class-based obstacles to fundamental freedoms, these constitutional
authorizations for action are transformed into a command. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel,
She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948 (2002) (suggesting a “synthetic reading of the
Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments that is grounded in the history of the
women suffrage movement”).
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position that disparate treatment predicated on andocentric ideals
inhibits women’s relative liberty interests in a way that a liberal
democracy, and we democrats that comprise it, should collectively try
to hinder. In the context of disparate treatment in the workplace, this
article embraces the value of women’s access to meaningful work over
other competing and otherwise important values—and most
particularly over, in this instance, the value of being free to use one’s
private power (like Ollie’s power to employ) in accordance to one’s
personal and inherently hierarchical worldview. In the instance of
disparate treatment, Ollie’s autonomous employment preferences
mean less to me than the prospect of correcting a broad-based
cultural inequity which ultimately (and admittedly not without
intervening causes) results in single women being one hundred
percent more likely to live in poverty than single men.109
Yet before anyone dons a beret and runs headlong towards the
Bastille, if we set aside for a moment the normative value being
vindicated, the concept that the state should or even must act to
interrupt some private but oppressive uses of power is not
controversial. For example, in our hypothetical BigLaw figuratively
shackles its female associates to the administrative work, but if BigLaw
instead adopted a practice of literally shackling unwilling associates in
those tiny cell-like offices, it is likely that even the most dogmatic of
libertarians would agree that the state is obliged to attempt to inhibit
this use of force. This may be because the idea of limiting an
individual’s freedom by force offends norms of autonomy and selfdetermination that are central to our understanding of a free society
as they are outlined in our constitution; or it may be because a state in
which some are confined while others are free offends norms of
egalitarianism that are central to our understanding of a free society
as they are outlined in our constitution; or it may be because by using
violence to enforce its will, BigLaw is usurping the role of the state as
a violence-monopolist, and thereby creating a threat to the stability of
the state and the overall efficiency of its society; or it may be because a
primary purpose, function or goal of a democracy is to oppose
“arbitrary hierarchy and domination.”110 Whichever of these views
one embraces, all converge in agreement that our state is usually
obliged to inhibit the violent imposition of one individual’s will upon
another.111 Thus, as a starting place, all agree that some form of
109. See Christopher, supra note 100, at 207 (providing that fifteen percent of
single men in the U.S. live in poverty compared to thirty-two percent of single
women).
110. Sklansky, supra note 105, at 1809.
111. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, UTOPIA 25 (1974) (arguing that
the only state necessary is a minimal one that “provide[s] protection for all in its
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private subordination should be inhibited by the state, and so the
remainder of the project is determining where the anti-subordination
line should be drawn.
Beyond the point of actual violent imposition on a neighbor, of
course, views diverge as to the degree to which the state is obliged or
authorized to interrupt private subordination. Some understand the
obligation and authorization of the state’s intervention to end with
violence itself, believing that absent violence, an individual may use
whatever power he legally possesses to leverage increasingly greater
advantage of his relative position.112 An unmodified version of this
dogmatically anti-state interventionist view would hold that in the
context of our hypothetical, even given the situation that the secondyear women associates are already at an experiential deficit due to
privately enforced gendered preferences, it is legitimate for
assignments to be allocated in accordance with gendered preferences,
and it is also legitimate for the male associates to use their relative
advantage to continue to attract the plum assignments and increase
the experiential gender gap. At the point where the experiential gap
has effectively rendered the women unqualified for advancement, the
anti-interventionist would hold that the women should leave—as they
do both in our hypothetic and in reality of the BigLaw market—which
may well be acceptable to the anti-interventionist when weighed
against other values he holds in higher priority.
Then, on the other hand, there are those who would favor some
type of intervention to check private gendered hierarchies, which
result in disparate treatment and outcomes at work. The question is
which type of intervention is best. For the most part, the only system
that has been in place up until now is the so-called “civil rights” or
“regulatory model” of dealing with gender discrimination. In this
model, private hierarchical preferences are prohibited by law, and
legal penalties attach to private actors who violate the antidiscriminatory norms articulated by the statutes/doctrines. The civil
rights model represents the dominant model of antidiscrimination
enforcement, it is the antidiscrimination model, which has taken us
from the Civil Rights Act of 1964 until the present moment, and it has
always been controversial.
B. Governance Versus Regulation:
Welcome Back to the Machine
Remember the 1980s? There was a great deal of fervor foretelling
territory”).
112. Id.
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of the end of “big government” and advocating trickle-down theories
of distributive justice, amid, generally speaking, rather a lot of Izods.
Well there are those among us who predict that the recent
resurrection of up-turned collars on day-glow Izods may be harbingers
of other things eighties to come. There is talk of revolution (again)
in legal discourse, and some are selling the moment as one of “crucial
. . . renewal and reinvention” and honoring the “analytical tour de
force” which harkens “a shift from the traditional New Deal
regulatory” paradigm to the better day of unshackled market forces,
and increased faith in the corporation-paternus.113 Other voices are
more temperate, but generally advocates of the governance approach
tend to see it as a response to a changing world of technology
innovation, globalization, and the concurrent development of a “new”
workplace, while opponents might describe it more politically,
attributing deregulation successes to a shifting of ideology on the
bench. Many advocates and opponents see both opportunity and
pitfalls within the new deregulation paradigm as it applies to the
workplace.114 But, they decidedly see it coming.115
113. Lobel, supra note 19, at 343-44. Professor Lobel further describes the model:
The Renew Deal governance model imports features from the organization
of the market into the public sphere. At the same time, albeit to a lesser
degree, it orchestrates the importation of public values into the new
private-sector economy. A recurring theme of the new model is that state
and government agencies should learn from the practices of private
organizational models and market-based management theories. The use of
private firms as an analogy to other social spheres reflects the growing
opinion that broad developments in the market economy trigger direct
changes in law. In many contexts, the interconnections between the object
of regulation (the economy) and the strategy by which it is regulated (law)
motivate the push for renewal through the adoption of market practices in
the public sphere.
Id. at 365-66 (citations omitted).
114. For an overview of both the opportunities and pitfalls within the deregulation
movement in the employment context, see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of
the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 322 (2005).
Self-regulatory processes in which workers participate can introduce
flexibility and responsiveness into the regulatory regime, and can reduce the
costs and contentiousness associated with litigation, while promoting the
internalization of public law norms into the workplace itself. The problem,
of course, is that the move toward self-regulation has coincided with a drastic
decline in unionization, the only legally sanctioned vehicle in the United
States for employee representation within the firm.
Id.; see also Sturm, supra note 2, at 470 (describing the pitfalls that arise due to
subjective decision making); see also Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 67 (1997) (outlining normative advantages
of governance over regulation, while identifying the limited scope of the application
of negotiated rules).
115. See Estlund, supra note 114, at 324 (expressing concern over the decline of
unions at the same time that deregulation is occurring); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3-7
(1992) (addressing the pitfalls of deregulation with a theoretical new model called
responsive regulation, whereby regulations form in response to the specific needs and
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While there are many versions of the “governance” model as it
stands in contrast to the “regulatory” model, there are common
threads throughout.
Advocates of governance as opposed to
regulation tend to agree that the regulatory model is “hierarchical,
state-centric, bureaucratic, top-down and expert-driven,” and that its
primary failing concerns its one-size-fits-all approach to workplace
problem solving, which produces “fragmentary, piecemeal, and highly
prescriptive regulatory interventions,” which tend to result in an
“impossibly complex and tangled web” of rules.116 Moreover, in
service of the goal of inhibiting—in our context—gender
discrimination, the regulatory paradigm applies these nonspecific
piecemeal rules in a manner that makes future applications difficult
to predict, and in a manner which often misses the point of the value
which was to be protected.117 In the process of shoving round
problems into the square holes carved out by courts, the model chills
innocuous behaviors thereby imposing even greater burdens on
individual autonomy, and often times aggravating gendered
disparities.118 Similarly it often produces very inefficient results as
employers must address potentially discriminatory problems by
weighing litigation risks rather than modeling results-oriented
solutions.119
In contrast, the “governance” model while, again, varied, tends to
aspire “instead to be more open-textured, participatory, bottom-up,
consensus-oriented,
contextual,
flexible,
integrative,
and
120
pragmatic.”
In many versions of the model it realizes this
adaptiveness through a “best practices” paradigm of “information
pressure points of an industry).
116. Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the
World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474
(2004).
117. Sturm, supra note 2, at 470.
118. Id. at 477. Sturm identifies potentially aggravating applications:
For example, lawyers may counsel employers to avoid sexual harassment
problems by discouraging informal or social contact among men and women.
Of course, this advice fails to achieve the sought-after-status of a legal safe
harbor, and it undercuts the capacity of preventive action to further the goals
of equal employment opportunity. Advice of this character necessarily
trivializes the problem of sexual harassment. It defines the scope of the
problem underinclusively so that the general and fundamental problem of
women's access and participation remains unaddressed.
Id.
119. Id. at 476. Sturm states, “In a rule-enforcement process, problems tend to be
redefined as discrete legal violations with sanctions attached. Fear of liability for
violation of ambiguous legal norms induces firms to adopt strategies that reduce the
short-term risk of legal exposure rather than strategies that address the underlying
problem.” Id.
120. Karkkainen, supra note 116, at 474.
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feedback loops [and] benchmarking.”121 The common operational
theme of the model is a devolution of the litigation model of rights
enforcement, and the evolution of voluntary compliance with
antidiscriminatory standards within employment contexts. Cynthia
Estlund has described this notoriously difficult to articulate model
within the employment context, explaining:
Procedures vary, but they typically involve charging one or more
employees with overseeing compliance with legal requirements (as
part or all of their job), and establishing procedures for other
employees to report apparent violations. Those programs respond
in part to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which promise
mitigation of criminal sentencing for firms with effective internal
compliance programs. The Sentencing Guidelines play a minor
role in the labor and employment arena, where criminal liability
and prosecution are rare. But doctrinal developments under the
employment discrimination laws . . . have played a similar role in
spurring the growth of internal compliance regimes in the
employment context. Both regimes are representative of a legal
and political climate that has promoted the growth of habits and
structures of internal compliance across a wide range of regulatory
arenas. The existence of these structures has, in turn, enhanced
the credibility of firms’ demands for more cooperative regulatory
approaches and for more latitude to self-regulate their labor
practices.122

Professor Estlund further observes that the movement to deregulate
has not “made major inroads on the basic federal labor standards
statutes themselves. Still, state and federal regulatory agencies have
begun to experiment with forms of self-regulation within the confines
of these command-and-control statutes.”123 Moreover, although
accounts of the degree to which the implementation of federal
employment standards should (or would or will) be delegated (or
deferred) or privately enforced compliance schemes by courts
(and/or agencies), for the model to realize its maximum
responsiveness and flexibility-based potential there must be at least
some form of public relief from the ever-present risk of litigation. In
the gender context, if the model indeed arrives in fullest force, we
should expect some litigation-curbing either in the form of increasing
doctrinal relief, or EEOC promulgated relief, or possibly even some
form of Congressional relief amending the current statutory/
administrative agency scheme.
Some employment-egalitarians are cautiously optimistic about the
121. Id.
122. Estlund, supra note 114, at 342 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 342-43.
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potential application of the model to the employment context.124 For
example, scholars such as Sturm see opportunity for the greater
flexibility of the model to provide better workplace outcomes, which
are clearly not being satisfactorily addressed by the current regulatory
regime. Sturm describes the application of a problem-solving
framework to gendered employment problems:
[The problem-solving] process identifies the legal and
organizational dimensions of the problem, encourages
organizations to gather and share relevant information, builds
individual and institutional capacity to respond, and helps design
and evaluate solutions that involve employees who participate in the
day-to-day patterns that produce bias and exclusion. An effective
system of external accountability, including judicial involvement as
a catalyst, would encourage organizations to identify and correct
these problems without creating increased exposure to liability, and
to learn from other organizations that have engaged in similar
efforts.125

By way of contrast, a strictly regulatory regime, Sturm contends,
diverts emphasis and resources away from solving particular workplace
problems, and towards protecting the employer from liability.
Moreover, the allocation of resources which must be directed towards
protecting against liability is so substantial that alternative methods of
solving gendered workplace problems are rarely explored. Also, and
importantly, Sturm views liability-protecting legal commitments often
to be in conflict with what might otherwise be internally-driven
solutions to gendered problems.126 Sturm also notes that an
internally-driven problem-solving regime lacks theoretical grounding
to broad-based discriminatory problems. She encapsulates the
dilemma thusly: “Externally-imposed solutions also founder because
124. See generally id.; Sturm, supra note 2.
125. Sturm, supra note 2, at 475.
126. Id. at 475-76.
Under the current system, employers producing information that reveals
problems or patterns of exclusion increase the likelihood that they will be
sued. Thus, lawyers counsel clients not to collect data that could reveal racial
or gender problems or to engage in self-evaluation, because that information
could be used to establish a plaintiff's case.
Id. However, this particular example illustrates less a problem with the regulatory
approach, and more the tension within particular companies between the value of
gender equality and other competing values. If a company compiles information
regarding gender discrimination and does not act on that information, the data
becomes a liability. Of course, in failing to act where a discriminatory pattern exists
also exposes the company to liability. But where the company compiles the data and
takes steps to remedy the problem, as it should, then its exposure to liability is less
than it would have been without collecting the data. The problem is not that the
company may be unjustly punished for trying to learn about its gendered practices,
the problems is that the company may learn about its gendered practices and chose
not to act.
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they cannot be sufficiently sensitive to context or integrated into the
day-to-day practice that shapes their implementation.
Yet,
internally-generated solutions are often insufficiently attentive to their
normative implications, or to the connection between those local
practices and the general antidiscrimination norm.”127
This statement perhaps best isolates the choices that egalitarianminded advocates face in assessing the possibilities and pitfalls of
scaling back employer liability in the context of gender
discrimination. On the one hand, the regulatory approach is
insensitive to particular employment situations and often poorly
tailored to specific problems. On the other hand, an internally-driven
system which is not directed at addressing systemic inequities or
fostering less misogynistic notions about women will not address those
inequities or foster those norms.
The question then becomes whether we should primarily be trying
to address the employment problems of individual women in their
specific contexts, or if we should be trying to create system change
through the enforcement of uniform norms. Sturm believes that we
can do both if we are open to the possibilities of the governance
model, while retaining mandatory procedural safeguards such as
third-party disinterested monitors to oversee compliance with federal
baselines. If these procedural safeguards could be effectively utilized,
the innovative and adaptive nature of the model could better respond
to the particularized needs of women in specific employment contexts
while not comprising the overall goals of anti-discrimination measures
if these problems stem from a systemic, broad-based and complex set
of biases directed against gendered qualities.128 This would be
wonderful. It would be wonderful if individual employment problems
could be more efficiently and effectively resolved without
compromising the ability of federal regulation to promote broadbased anti-discrimination norms.
However, one of the potential problems of an approach that
attempts to retain federal baseline prohibitions against “gender
discrimination” yet allows employers or third-party moderators to
ensure compliance with those guidelines is that it presents something
of a “hydra” dilemma. “Guidelines” or baselines or whatever set of
norms we institute and avoid calling rules must be interpreted. The
problem of interpretation is a central aspect of the regulation
model—it is perhaps the primary aspect of the model that makes it so
unresponsive and burdensome—but it is also a problem that simply

127. Id. at 475-76.
128. Id.
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cannot be severed from any system in which there are baseline
antidiscriminatory standards. To have a baseline means to have a
substantive understanding of permissible behaviors.
Under a
governance model, the problem of substantively interpreting and
applying those standards remains the same, but the responsibility of
resolving that problem is simply relocated to different actors.
Who then should define the substance of norms relating to gender
equality? This question returns us again to the issue of what we are
trying to achieve with anti-discrimination measures. If we are trying to
solve individual employers’ problems, then individual employers or
their compliance teams may well be the most competent people to
decide what does and what does not constitute discrimination.
However, if we are trying to redress the fact that individual employers
evidence a preference or andocentric ideals, then individual
employers may not be the go-to guys regarding defining
discrimination. More: if we are trying to eradicate a situation in which
single women are one hundred percent more likely to live in poverty
than single men, then BigLaw’s voluntary compliance team may not
be the most sensible place to begin. And in terms of transferring the
responsibility of defining the substantive parameters of antidiscrimination measures from the courts to third parties or other
actors, ultimately and unfortunately for women, we must recall here
who is sitting at that decision-making table of the third-party monitor
or the voluntary compliance team. Women are underrepresented in
positions of power in virtually every employment situation in which
governance would replace regulation.129 When we are talking about a
system of substantive gate keeping that controls women’s access to
fundamental liberties, are we comfortable leaving that responsibility
in the hands of the same hierarchical dynamic that constructed the
disparity initially?
Here, the significance of identifying the nature of bias that
accounts for second generation gender discrimination becomes clear.
If, as this paper posits, an andocentric-assimilation model of female
liberation accounts—at least to a significant degree—for the disparate
employment outcomes that exist within our current model, and if it
follows that employers are both largely unaware of their own
andocentric preferences and the manner in which these preferences
lead to disparate treatment and ultimately disparate outcomes for
most women—then a model which is directed at solving individual
workplace problems is much less likely to address and compensate for
those preferences. Instead, within a system where the bias is already

129. See Jones, supra note 29.
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thoroughly obscured, a model which moves away from objective and
broad analysis directed at the manner in which BigLaw (to return to
our example) treats all female associates as compared to all male
associates is unlikely to capture the problem at BigLaw. An
individualized inquiry into each woman’s experience at BigLaw fails
to create a discriminatory picture. My friend, for example, who
opened our tale was assigned administrative work. No one told her
this was because she was a woman, and likely no one in power at
BigLaw—including the assigning partner—consciously thought it was
“because” she was a woman. Indeed, my friend might not have
thought this except that she had the example of all the other equally
qualified men and women associates to give her particular situation
context. To solve the problem at BigLaw, one has to be willing see it
within its larger framework—to see that something is afoot with
respect to women and assignments.
Also, to solve the problem at BigLaw, one has to agree that there is
a problem. To the extent that BigLaw fails to identify that the
assigning process is gendered—finding instead, for example, that
each individual associate was a particularly good fit with the bad work
for a reason that they can not only articulate, but that they believe—it
will be difficult for BigLaw to craft a solution that address BigLaw’s
gender preferences. BigLaw sees the problem from the inside and is
confident that on an individual level, no one is acting out of an
animus directed against women as a class. However, under the
regulatory model, BigLaw cannot be satisfied that it is not acting out
of misogynist impulse. Under the regulatory model, BigLaw has to
worry about what a judge or a jury may think of the facts of the
situation from the outside: all of the women and none of the men
doing the bad work; an incredibly high female attrition rate;
remarkably few women partners. Whether BigLaw ever confronts its
internalized andocentric preferences, the regulatory model forces
BigLaw to be afraid of disparate outcomes, which is incredibly
important for women given the illusiveness of this particular bias.
In this sense, one of the primary social goods of antidiscrimination
law in the gender context is not its ability to solve particular workplace
problems for particular women, or particular employment sectors, or
even particular markets, but is instead in its ability to respond
meaningfully to nonparticularized, broad-based, and systemic
problems like those posed by the andocentric-assimilation paradigm
of gendered preferences. In the gender context, antidiscrimination
law’s primarily strength lies in the threat of liability attached to
outcomes and appearances, rather than subjective intent. In other
words it is the inefficiency of this very inefficient body of law that
provides its primary benefit to women living in a patriarchy. It is the
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broader application of articulated principles, and their attendant
inflexibility and lack of responsiveness, that allows the fast-paced
evolution of the doctrine to account for and address inter alia:
disparities in bargaining positions; the sometimes absence of
economic alternatives or other market-based corrections; the often
unintentional or unconscious nature of the imposition of hierarchical
preferences; and the frequently self-sustaining systems of oppression
the imposition of those preferences erect. In other words, the critics
are correct that the model is over-inclusive, and under-inclusive, that
it fails to account for individual variances, and to conform to the
particulars of particularized contexts, that it offers vague guidelines
and unpredictable future outcomes which have a chilling effect and
which inevitably spawn poorly tailored internal corrections. These are
its strengths.130
However the critics are not right that the model discourages or
tramples innovation. The pro-governance discourse itself empirically
denies this claim. All accounts of the model point to the fact that the
private sector is already engaged in the projects of innovative problem
solving, the appointment of compliance teams, and the business of
serious self-regulation. Moreover, the regulatory model does not
target these experiments in innovative compliance. The regulatory
model assesses and potentially punishes the results of the employment
laboratories only within the same imperfect machinery that it regards
all efforts at compliance: where the experiments trigger systemic
oppressions, the hulking regulatory system will try to punish, and
where these concerns are not triggered, the regulatory model is
indifferent to the efforts of experimental compliance. Further, the
governance model itself recognizes that in the absence of punishment
(so where their experiment did not run afoul with basic norms),
innovation is its own reward—which is why the trend towards selfregulation already exists within the regulatory framework. Whether
130. Another strength of the regulatory system is that it places the control over
whether BigLaw is likely to care about a particular problem in the hands of the
individual is affected by that problem. In the absence of the threat of litigation, many
scholars have argued that market-driven forces will encourage individual employers to
seek solutions to particular problems, which could be true. But, under that system of
incentives, if an individual employee faces a bias-based problem that the market for
whatever reason fails to care about or correct for, then BigLaw has little incentive to
craft a solution. In contrast, under the regulatory model, where an individual
employee faces a bias-based problem, she can still seek direct redress from BigLaw.
However, if the problem is one that the market does not correct for, or BigLaw
otherwise does not care about it, the employee can insist that BigLaw respond, if only
by investigating the legitimacy of her complaint due to the implicit threat of
litigation. Under the regulatory model, the employee is not beholden to BigLaw or
compliance teams, or third party arbitrators to recognize her problem as one that
merits redress, and in this way she retains an important degree of control over the
process.
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these trends reflect an effort either to shield itself from litigation
burdens or to build stronger, more humane, or more competitive
businesses, they are not bad trends. They are experimental, they are
interesting, and they may even turn out to be better problem-solvers.
They are fine compliments to existing protections. But make no
mistake: they are not a substitute.
C. Working it out Together (While Carrying a Big Stick):
The Value of the Civil Rights Model
Certainly it must be worked out together. Even on the most
abstract level, there is of course no alternative. Even within the
regulatory model, broad-based rules and articulations of principle
must be applied by people, and therefore most of the decisions that
affect our daily lives and overall prospects in the workplace are arrived
at through individualized interpretations and applications. In this, it
is also helpful that we may start from the proposition that, again,
there are no moustache twirling villains to be vanquished here.
Rarely is the problem one of determined policy. We may start from
the premise that most of the working it out will occur between fairminded, well-meaning colleagues. The rules are a floor; a framework,
a fire escape that reaches two-thirds of the way to the ground. From
there we jump and rely on the kindness of strangers, the hope of
gender immigration, and the power of our basically egalitarianinclined culture, and the distant prospect of future court
appointments: and longevity of memory—we rely on that as well.
I, for example, remember that Sandra Day O’Connor graduated law
school in 1952,131 and yet when my father graduated law school
twenty-five years later there were four women in his class. Four. I
graduated in a class that was fifty-four percent female. What
happened in the generation that separates my father and I, that failed
to happen during preceding generations—for example, during the
generation in which women got the vote, or in the one in which Rosie
the Riveter marched into the factory and home again, during the
relative sexual liberties of the 1920s or the cultural deconstructions of
the 1960s?132 Reed v. Reed happened.133 Griswold happened.134
131. See Brenda Kruse, Comment, Women of the Highest Court: Does Gender or
Personal Life Experiences Influence Their Opinions, 36 TOL. L. REV. 995, 999 (2005)
(providing that when Justice O’Connor graduated from Stanford in 1952, she was
unable to find work in the private sector despite great academic achievement).
132. See Jennifer E. Sturiale, The Passage of Community Property Laws, 19391947: Was “More than Money” Involved?, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 213, 232 (2005)
(explaining that Rosie the Riveter was a government created character used to
encourage World War II women to join the workforce).
133. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (overturning an Idaho statute that preferred men over
women as estate administrators).
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Title VII happened. Civil rights law happened.
For example, in 1984, a woman named Hishon walked into a
federal court to court to challenge King & Spalding’s informal
practice of never inviting women to be partners.135 Prior to the
enactment of Title VII, Hishon would have pled that the practice was
unfair. In 1984 she was able to describe it as illegal. Is it possible that
we should forget the difference this makes?136 It is the difference
between asking hat in hand for equal consideration in the face of
broad-based institutional preferences to the contrary, and requesting
one’s due with the full force of the law standing silently behind you.
The civil rights model makes manifest the difference between
subordinate and equal.
Yet, it is not a perfect model. It is certainly, certainly not the most
efficient model that might be adopted. It is over-inclusive and it is
under-inclusive. It fails to account for individual variances, and to
conform to the particulars of particularized contexts. It offers vague
guidelines and unpredictable future outcomes which have a chilling
effect and which spawn poorly tailored internal corrections. It has
failed to eradicate gender prejudice from the hearts of men (and
women). It is not a perfect model, and like every hero, it becomes a
bore at last.137 For example, sixteen years after the Hishon decision,
at the turn of a new century the New Jersey Supreme Court wryly
observed:
Women were perhaps overly sanguine in 1984 following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding, holding
that women could claim bias in partnership decisions by employers.
Some said that the decision “proclaimed the end of the ‘old boys’
network.” Apparently not so. Old habits die hard. While Hishon’s
suit was pending in the Supreme Court, it was reported that the
firm considered holding a wet t-shirt contest for the firm’s summer
associates.138
134. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that state law
forbidding birth control use was unconstitutional).
135. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
136. See Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Legal & Political Perspectives on the Battle
over Same-Sex Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 13 (2005).
The campaign for women’s rights hit its stride when its advocates adopted the
NAACP’s model and pursued two interconnected litigation strategies. First,
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) lawyers adopted a step-by-step
approach aimed at persuading judges that gender discrimination was
analogous to racial discrimination and, therefore, deserved heightened
constitutional scrutiny.
Id.
137. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Uses of Great Men, in REPRESENTATIVE MEN (1850).
138. Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc.,164 N.J. 38, 38 n.10 (2000) (refraining
from actually criticizing the civil rights model, but stating this as an example of the
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Old habits die hard. But do we imagine for a moment that women
at King & Spalding were better off when they were never considered
for partnerships and they were inducted into wet t-shirt contests? Old
habits indeed die hard. Twenty-one years ago, King & Spalding was in
the habit of never inviting women to be partners.139 Thirty-three
years ago Harvard Law School was in the habit of never hiring women
as tenured faculty.140 Eighty-five years ago our own democratic
experiment was in the habit of never allowing women to cast a
ballot.141 Old habits die hard, but they do, eventually, die—
particularly with the assistance of a state-issued mandate.
And finally, the women litigators: what of the failure of the rulesbased model to address their discrimination issue? They have two
choices in this model. They could sue—they may win, and in the
evolving jurisprudential climate, they may lose. If they win, firms will
be forced to be afraid to be indifferent to gender disparities in
assignments, and that particular manifestation of the andocentricassimilation model will likely be improved. If they lose, the protection
of the chilling effect of the unresolved question of genderedassignments will be lost and that particular problem may be
aggravated.
Alternatively, the women litigators could, right now, without deregulation and within the regulatory model, try to negotiate with their
respective firms’ administrations a better, fairer, less discriminatory
method of assignment allocation. This route, too, might result in a
solution to their problem and likely even a better solution for these
particular women than a law suit would render. The powers that be
well might be motivated to tailor a remedy to their complaint, and if
that happens, it seems likely that the tailored resolution will redress
the particulars of the issues these women raise. It may happen that
BigLaw will be moved to negotiate with the women litigators—these
otherwise fully fungible workers, whom BigLaw has hired knowing
their tenure is statistically likely to be brief. But if it happens that
BigLaw is motivated to negotiate with these women, it will be because
when they come to the table they stand there holding a big, silent,
motivating stick. BigLaw will have to decide whether it would be
persistent observation that despite important legal victories, sexism itself has failed to
disappear).
139. In 2003, thirty-five of King & Spalding’s two hundred partners were women.
See Sarah Rubenstein, A First for Law Firm King & Spalding, ATLANTA BUSINESS
CHRONICLE, May 16-22, 2003 http://kslaw.com/library/pdf/tandyarticle.pdf.
140. See Basile, supra note 3, at 144 (noting that today, women comprise sixteen
percent of Harvard Law School’s tenured faculty).
141. Today one hundred percent of qualified women are permitted to vote, more
or less. U.S. CONT. amend. XIX.
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more efficient to change their discriminatory practice or roll the dice
on an unfavorable ruling. On the other hand, absent a complaint by
an individual employee with the specific threat of litigation behind it,
in BigLaw’s view it has been more efficient for the last decade to allow
women associates to hemorrhage out, and hire new ones than to solve
its gendered attrition problem. So no, the civil rights model is not a
perfect system, but the burden of a vast majority of its imperfections
fall against efficiency, not equality or liberty; they fall against the
employer, not the employed; they fall against the machine rather than
the women within it.
CONCLUSION
Given the prevalence of the andocentric-assimilation paradigm, and
a workforce landscape in which women are underrepresented in
positions of power, women are better served by an antidiscrimination
model which stresses the ad hoc application of broad-based rules, the
substance of which are defined by an unpredictable neutral arbitrator.
In other words, we are better served by the regulatory system we have
spent the better part of the last thirty-five years building. That is not
to say that more cannot be done or should not be done or that
innovation has no place solving problems presented by the current
ordering of gendered preferences. It is only to say that “new” ideas
and applications can sometimes be additional ideas and applications,
they need not always be prefaced with a ceremonial burning of the
bridge that got us this far. We should not allow existing protections to
recede. Instead, we should work to understand the nature of the
gendered biases that continue to color our professional opportunities
and advocate for those new ideas about discrimination to transform
our ever-evolving gendered norms. Finally, at a cultural moment in
which andocentric norms remain unchecked and in which we seem to
confuse increasingly capitalism with democracy and unfettered
markets with liberty, to conclude that women’s own big sticks would
be more sagely wielded by tyrannus-mercatus, is, I think, a mistake.
Speaking for myself, I’ll keep the stick.
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